Volume 2013 (2013), Article ID 761482, 13 pages
The Respective Effects of Being Observed and Sanctioned in Modified Dictator and Ultimatum Games
1University of Picardie (France) and GREDEG, University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis, UMR n∘ 6227,
250 rue Albert Einstein, 06560 Valbonne Cedex, France
2University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis and GREDEG, UMR n∘ 6227, 250 rue Albert Einstein, 06560 Valbonne Cedex, France
Received 27 November 2012; Accepted 28 January 2013
Academic Editors: I. Shoji and E. Silva
Copyright © 2013 Agnès Festré and Pierre Garrouste. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
We experiment within a laboratory the respective effects of being observed and sanctioned in both a dictator and an ultimatum game. We obtain the classical results that individuals do not play the subgame perfect equilibria. We also show that being observed increases the offers made by the proposer in the dictator game but this effect is difficult to identify in the ultimatum game. We also find that in the dictator game, the more the individuals are sensitive to observation the less they are to sanction.