A New Accident Analysis Method Based on Complex Network and Cascading Failure

Table 1

Causation factors of the 7.23 China Yongwen railway accident [30].

Ministry of Railways	A1: seek quick success and benefits; A2: week management and incomplete rule standards; A3: unclear job responsibilities and functions; A4: inadequate inspection and supervision for Shanghai Railway Bureau.
Department of Technologies, Foundation Department, Science and Technology Division CRSC	B1: lack of careful supervision on the bidding of the equipment in Hening-Hewu Yongwen line train control center; B2: poor management of the operation on new products; B3: not enough examination of the LKD2-T1; B4: without clear regulations on the technical review; B5: no valid or regular technical prereview on the equipment LKD2-T1 for train control center; B6: illegal approval from the Science and Technology Division approved to use the LKD2-T1; B7: inadequate inspection and supervision of the quality management by CRSC; B8: little supervision or inspection from CRSC who fully transmit the project to the local design institute; B9: cursory decision on the bidding for the Hening-Hewu line control equipment; B10: unware of the illegal change of version of the train control center equipment in Hefei station.
Shanghai Railway Bureau and the signaling design institute	C1: not enough safety education and training; C2: not sufficient inspection and supervision; C3: not sensitive safety awareness; not efficient measures to avoid or alleviate the accident; C4: not appropriate accident handling; C5: unwise decision on update of the LKD2-T1; C6: lack of the technical review on the development of the equipment for train control center; C7: lack of responsibility on scientific research management and inefficient control and supervision of the local companies on the product quality.
Vehicle depot, electricity depot, engineering system and train control institute	D1: poor travel management and emergency handling; D2: not efficient supervision on the safety production management and train service work; lack of supervision to Wenzhou south station; D3: poor supervision on the dispatching institute and the vehicle depot system; D4: insufficient education and training for the staff; D5: lack of job responsibilities of the electricity emergency management; D6: cursory design of the equipment LKD2-T1; D7: poor equipment research and development management in the train control center; D8: the redesign of the equipment LKD2-T1 by the train control institute.
The attendants’ behaviors and process	E1: failure of following further situation of red band by the dispatcher in Shanghai Railway Bureau; E2: careless monitoring on the situation of D3115; E3: no reminder of the emergency to D301; E4: no in time contact with the D301 driver; E5: no record of the circuit failure of the 5829AG; E6: no record of the replacement of some equipments of the track circuit besides 5829AG; E7: illegal behaviors; E8: the mistake to inform D3115 to switch to the visual driving mode if the signal was red; E9: D3115 stopped by the ATP; E10: D3115 failed to drive in visual mode 3 times; E11: D3115 failed to report to the dispatcher; E12: D3115 switched to the visual driving mode but still in the 5829AG; E13: D301 left Yongjia station; E14: D301 rear-ended D3115; E15: illegal to open the protection net for work.
Equipment and environment	F1: the damage of 4 sender boxes; F2: the damage of 2 receiver boxes; F3: the damage of 1 attenuator; F4: the fuse of F2 in LKD2-T1; F5: the design flaw in PIO of LKD2-T1; F6: the activation of ATP on the D3115; F7: thunder strike; F8: failure of the ATP on D301 which did not take any action; F9: the reduction of CAN total resistance; F10: unavailable communication between 5829AG and the train control center; F11: wrong displays on the terminal; F12: abnormal track circuit signal; F13: a red band; F14: wrong signal which maintained green for the faulted track section; F15: the sending of the unoccupied signal to D301.