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Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Volume 2013 (2013), Article ID 695384, 5 pages
The Game Analysis of Manufacturers’ Political Connections on Product Safety in Supply Chain: Evidence from China
School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China
Received 18 June 2013; Revised 20 September 2013; Accepted 29 October 2013
Academic Editor: Tinggui Chen
Copyright © 2013 Zhao Na and Wang Fusheng. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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