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Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Volume 2014 (2014), Article ID 803073, 11 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/803073
Research Article

Project Capital Allocation Combination Equilibrium Decision Model Based on Behavioral Option Game

1School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
2Institute of Metal Resources Strategy, Changsha 410083, China

Received 13 March 2014; Accepted 20 May 2014; Published 18 June 2014

Academic Editor: Fenghua Wen

Copyright © 2014 Meirui Zhong et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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