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Economics Research International
Volume 2013 (2013), Article ID 352847, 11 pages
Sequential Divestiture and Firm Asymmetry
School of Business, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Received 13 November 2012; Revised 22 January 2013; Accepted 23 January 2013
Academic Editor: Jean Paul Chavas
Copyright © 2013 Wen Zhou. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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