Walk the Talk? The Effect of Voting and Excludability in Public Goods Experiments

Table 3

The effect of voting and excludability on individual contributions in Experiment 1.

Variable	Model 1 (LS^a)	Model 2 (Mixed effects^b)	Model 3 (Mixed effects^c)
Dependent variable	Group average of individual contribution	Individual contribution	Individual contribution
CONSTANT	5.340^∗∗∗	5.885^∗∗∗	5.925^∗∗∗
ROUND	−0.055^∗∗∗	−0.057^∗∗∗	−0.057^∗∗∗
EXCLUDABLE PG (YES = 1)	−0.336^∗∗∗	−0.884^∗∗∗	−0.902^∗∗
VOTING (YES = 1)	−0.093
PROJECT A (YES = 1)	0.618^∗∗∗
VOTED FOR A & A CHOSEN		0.425^∗∗∗
VOTED FOR A & B CHOSEN		0.057
VOTED FOR B & B CHOSEN		0.313
VOTED & CHOSEN			0.373^∗∗
𝐹-statistic	32.3
Akaike Info Criterion		7531	7525
Number of obs.	880 (44 groups × 20 rounds)	1600 (random effects for 80 subjects)
Conditions	All	Voting

∗∗∗significant at 1% level, ∗∗significant at 5% level, ∗significant at 10% level.
aLeast squares estimation with robust standard errors. bMixed effects model, maximum likelihood estimation. cMixed effects model, maximum likelihood estimation.