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Economics Research International
Volume 2011 (2011), Article ID 318523, 6 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2011/318523
Research Article

A Full Participation Agreement on Global Emission Reduction through Strategic Investments in R&D

Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, TU Braunschweig, Spielmannstraβe 9, 38106 Braunschweig, Germany

Received 2 August 2011; Revised 18 August 2011; Accepted 6 September 2011

Academic Editor: Henk Folmer

Copyright © 2011 Uwe Kratzsch et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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