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Economics Research International
Volume 2012 (2012), Article ID 818716, 17 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2012/818716
Research Article

Incomplete Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Collusion-Proofness

Faculdade de Economia do Porto, Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200-464 Porto, Portugal

Received 27 May 2011; Revised 2 October 2011; Accepted 3 October 2011

Academic Editor: David E. Giles

Copyright © 2012 Marco Meireles and Paula Sarmento. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

How to Cite this Article

Marco Meireles and Paula Sarmento, “Incomplete Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Collusion-Proofness,” Economics Research International, vol. 2012, Article ID 818716, 17 pages, 2012. doi:10.1155/2012/818716