About this Journal Submit a Manuscript Table of Contents
Economics Research International
Volume 2012 (2012), Article ID 818716, 17 pages
Research Article

Incomplete Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Collusion-Proofness

Faculdade de Economia do Porto, Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200-464 Porto, Portugal

Received 27 May 2011; Revised 2 October 2011; Accepted 3 October 2011

Academic Editor: David E. Giles

Copyright © 2012 Marco Meireles and Paula Sarmento. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Linked References

  1. D. P. Baron and R. B. Myerson, “Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs,” Econometrica, vol. 50, pp. 911–930, 1982.
  2. J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole, “Using cost information to regulate firms,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, pp. 921–937, 1986.
  3. T. R. Lewis and D. Sappington, “Regulating a monopolist with unknown demand,” American Economic Review, vol. 78, pp. 986–998, 1988.
  4. B. Caillaud, “Regulation, competition, and asymmetric information,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 87–110, 1990. View at Scopus
  5. J. J. Laffont and D. Martimort, “Collusion under asymmetric information,” Econometrica, vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 875–911, 1997.
  6. J. J. Laffont and D. Martimort, “Mechanism design with collusion and correlation,” Econometrica, vol. 68, no. 2, pp. 309–342, 2000.
  7. T. P. Tangerås, “Collusion-proof yardstick competition,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 83, no. 2, pp. 231–254, 2002. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar
  8. Y. Che, “Revolving doors and the optimal tolerance for agency collusion,” Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 26, pp. 378–397, 1995.
  9. H. Itoh, “Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 60, no. 2, pp. 410–427, 1993. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at MathSciNet
  10. J. Lawarrëe and D. Shin, “Organizational flexibility and cooperative task allocation among agents,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 161, no. 4, pp. 621–635, 2005. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  11. D. Shin, “Contracts under wage compression: a case of beneficial collusion,” Southern Economic Journal, vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 143–157, 2007.
  12. G. Biglaiser and C. A. Ma, “Regulating a dominant firm: unknown demand and industry structure,” The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 1–19, 1995.
  13. C. Aubert and J. Pouyet, “Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion,” Review of Economic Design, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 113–142, 2006. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at MathSciNet
  14. J. Green and J.-J. Laffont, “Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods,” Econometrica, vol. 45, pp. 427–435, 1977.
  15. R. Myerson, “Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem,” Econometrica, vol. 47, pp. 61–73, 1979.
  16. J. Tirole, “Hierarchies and bureaucracies: on the role of collusion in organizations,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 181–214, 1986. View at Scopus