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Economics Research International
Volume 2013 (2013), Article ID 352847, 11 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/352847
Research Article

Sequential Divestiture and Firm Asymmetry

School of Business, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Received 13 November 2012; Revised 22 January 2013; Accepted 23 January 2013

Academic Editor: Jean Paul Chavas

Copyright © 2013 Wen Zhou. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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