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Economics Research International
Volume 2013 (2013), Article ID 470412, 8 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/470412
Research Article

Information in Repeated Ultimatum Game with Unknown Pie Size

Department of Decision Sciences and Managerial Economics, Faculty of Business Administration, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Received 24 August 2012; Revised 15 November 2012; Accepted 27 November 2012

Academic Editor: Philip J. Grossman

Copyright © 2013 Ching Chyi Lee and William K. Lau. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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