http://www.hindawi.com The latest articles from Hindawi Publishing Corporation © 2013 , Hindawi Publishing Corporation . All rights reserved. Tue, 11 Jun 2013 13:20:50 +0000 http://www.hindawi.com/journals/gt/2013/754398/ The paper has as a starting point the work of the philosopher Professor D. Lewis. We provide a detailed presentation and complete analysis of the sender/receiver Lewis signaling game using a game theory extensive form, decision tree formulation. It is shown that there are a number of Bayesian equilibria. We explain which equilibrium is the most likely to prevail. Our explanation provides an essential step for understanding the formation of a language convention. The informational content of signals is discussed and it is shown that a correct action is not always the result of a truthful signal. We allow for this to be reflected in the payoff of the sender. Further, concepts and approaches from neighbouring disciplines, notably economics, suggest themselves immediately for interpreting the results of our analysis (rational expectations, self-fulfilling prophesies). Xeni Dassiou and Dionysius Glycopantis Copyright © 2013 Xeni Dassiou and Dionysius Glycopantis. All rights reserved. Wed, 22 May 2013 11:03:26 +0000 http://www.hindawi.com/journals/gt/2013/534875/ Recently, it was shown that Chess-like games may have no uniform (subgame perfect) Nash equilibria in pure positional strategies. Moreover, Nash equilibria may fail to exist already in two-person games in which all infinite plays are equivalent and ranked as the worst outcome by both players. In this paper, we extend this negative result further, providing examples that are uniform Nash equilibria free, even in mixed or independently mixed strategies. Additionally, in case of independently mixed strategies we consider two different definitions for effective payoff: the Markovian and the a priori realization. Endre Boros, Vladimir Gurvich, and Emre Yamangil Copyright © 2013 Endre Boros et al. All rights reserved.