About this Journal Submit a Manuscript Table of Contents
ISRN Economics
Volume 2013 (2013), Article ID 645481, 10 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/645481
Research Article

Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Sequential versus Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games

Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Sapienza University of Rome, Via Ariosto 25, 00185 Rome, Italy

Received 18 August 2013; Accepted 15 September 2013

Academic Editors: M. E. Kandil and M. Tsionas

Copyright © 2013 Marco A. Marini and Giorgio Rodano. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Linked References

  1. I. Mouraviev and P. Rey, “Collusion and leadership,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 705–717, 2011. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  2. C. d'Aspremont, A. Jaquemin, J. Gabszewicz, and J. Weymark, “On the stability of dominant cartels,” Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 14, pp. 17–25, 1982.
  3. C. d'Aspremont and J. J. Gabszewicz, “On the stability of collusion,” in New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure, J. Stiglitz and G. F. Mathewson, Eds., MIT Press, Boston, Mass, USA, 1986.
  4. M. Donsimoni, N. Economides, and H. Polemarchakis, “Stable cartels,” International Economic Review, vol. 27, pp. 317–327, 1986.
  5. A. Daughety, “Beneficial concentration,” American Economic Review, vol. 80, no. 5, pp. 1231–1237, 1990.
  6. D. Levine, “Horizontal mergers: the 50-percent benchmark,” American Economic Review, vol. 80, no. 5, pp. 1238–1245, 1990.
  7. S. Huck, K. A. Konrad, and W. Müller, “Big fish eat small fish: on merger in Stackelberg markets,” Economics Letters, vol. 73, no. 2, pp. 213–217, 2001. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  8. J. S. Heywood and M. McGinty, “Leading and merging: convex costs, Stackelberg, and the merger paradox,” Southern Economic Journal, vol. 74, no. 3, pp. 879–893, 2008. View at Scopus
  9. M. Escrihuela-Villar and R. Faulí-Oller, “Mergers in asymmetric Stackelberg markets,” Spanish Economic Review, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 279–288, 2008. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  10. M. Marini, M. L. Petit, and R. Sestini, “Strategic timing in R&D agreements,” Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 2013. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar
  11. E. van Damme and S. Hurkens, “Endogenous Stackelberg leadership,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 105–129, 1999. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  12. E. van Damme and S. Hurkens, “Endogenous price leadership,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 404–420, 2004. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  13. B. von Stengel, “Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 512–516, 2010. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  14. E. Gal-Or, “First mover and second mover advantages,” International Economic Review, vol. 26, pp. 649–653, 1985.
  15. R. Amir, I. Grilo, and J. Jin, “Demand-induced endogenous price leadership,” International Game Theory Review, vol. 1, pp. 219–240, 1999.
  16. S. Dowrick, “von Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly: choosing roles,” The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 251–260, 1986.
  17. R. Amir, “Endogenous timing in two-player games: a counterexample,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 234–237, 1995. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  18. R. Amir and I. Grilo, “Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 1–21, 1999. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  19. S. Currarini and M. Marini, “A sequential approach to the characteristic function and the core in games with externalities,” in Advances in Economic Design, M. Sertel and A. Kara, Eds., Springer, Berlin, Germany, 2003.
  20. S. Currarini and M. Marini, “A conjectural cooperative equilibrium in strategic form games,” in Game Practise and the Environment, C. Carraro and V. Fragnelli, Eds., Kluwer Academic Press, Norwell, Mass, USA, 2004.
  21. B. von Stengel and S. Zamir, “Leadership games with convex strategy sets,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 446–457, 2010. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  22. D. Levine, “Stackelberg, Cournot and collusive monopoly: performance and welfare comparison,” Economic Inquiry, vol. 26, pp. 317–330, 1988.
  23. C. Figuières, M. Tidball, and A. Jean-Marie, “On the effects of conjectures in a symmetric strategic setting,” Research in Economics, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 75–102, 2004. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  24. D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA, 1998.
  25. S. W. Salant and G. Shaffer, “Optimal asymmetric strategies in research joint ventures,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 195–208, 1998. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar
  26. D. Leahy and P. J. Neary, “Symmetric research joint ventures: cooperative substitutes and complements,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 23, pp. 5381–6397, 2005.
  27. J. H. Hamilton and S. M. Slutsky, “Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 29–46, 1990. View at Scopus
  28. M. Amir, R. Amir, and J. Jin, “Sequencing R&D decisions in a two-period duopoly with spillovers,” Economic Theory, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 297–317, 2000. View at Scopus
  29. D. Ray and R. Vohra, “Equilibrium binding agreements,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 30–78, 1997.
  30. F. Bloch, “Coalition formation in games with spillovers,” in The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, C. Carraro, Ed., Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Series on Economics and the Environment, Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2003.
  31. S. S. Yi, “The endogenous formation of economic coalitions: the partition function approach,” in The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, C. Carraro, Ed., Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Series on Economics and the Environment, pp. 80–127, Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2003.
  32. D. Ray, A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2007.
  33. M. A. Marini, “Games of coalition and network formation: a survey,” in Networks, Dynamics and Topology, A. Naizmada, S. Stefani, and A. Torriero, Eds., Springer, London, UK, 2009.