Untangling RFID Privacy Models

Box 5

Ideal Functionality ℱ_{𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ}

(i) Upon receiving INITIATE  from  𝒫: if 𝒫 is corrupted then ignore this message. Else generate a unique

execution identification 𝑠𝑖𝑑, record init(𝑠𝑖𝑑,𝒫) and send init(𝑠𝑖𝑑,𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝒫),𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝒫)) to the adversary.

(ii) Upon receiving ACCEPT(𝑠𝑖𝑑,𝑠𝑖𝑑^′)  from the adversary: if there are two records init(𝑠𝑖𝑑,𝒫)

and init(𝑠𝑖𝑑^′,𝒫^′) where 𝒫 and 𝒫^′ are feasible partners, then remove them, record

partner(𝑠𝑖𝑑^′,𝒫^′,𝑠𝑖𝑑,𝒫) and write output ACCEPT (𝒫^′) to 𝒫. Else if there is a record

partner(𝑠𝑖𝑑,𝒫,𝑠𝑖𝑑^′,𝒫^′), then remove it and write output ACCEPT (𝒫^′) to 𝒫.

(iii) Upon receiving IMPERSONATE(𝑠𝑖𝑑,𝒫^′)   from the adversary: if there is a record init(𝑠𝑖𝑑,𝒫)

and party 𝒫^′ is corrupted, then remove this record and write output ACCEPT (𝒫^′) to 𝒫.

(iv) Upon receiving CORRUPT(𝑠𝑖𝑑)   from the adversary: if there is a record init(𝑠𝑖𝑑,𝒫) or

partner(𝑠𝑖𝑑,𝒫,𝑠𝑖𝑑^′,𝒫^′) such that 𝒫 is corruptible, then mark 𝒫 as corrupted and remove state (𝒫).