Abstract
HAPS is a promising technology capable of providing broadband multimedia services as an alternative to the satellite communication system or terrestrial network. In this study, economic aspects of HAPS service are analyzed, HAPS services are defined, and revenues from the defined services are forecasted assuming nine scenarios. Capital expenditure as well as operating expenditure is estimated. To evaluate the profitability of HAPS service, the net present value (NPV), payback period, and the internal rate of return (IRR) are calculated. The results show that HAPS is economically justifiable in all the scenarios. Assuming that ARPU for the service is $35 per month in the average scenario, NPV is calculated as $2964 million, IRR becomes 31.9%, and payback occurs in 2017, which implies that HAPS service is profitable in Korea. In addition, the results of the sensitivity analysis show that the results are fairly robust.
1. Introduction
Recent trends in the telecommunication and
broadcasting market can be summarized as the digital convergence of broadband
multimedia services [1]. In this drastic market changes, HAPS emerges as one of the challenging alternatives of service
platform since it is expected to afford sufficient bandwidth for multimedia
services for both telecommunication and broadcasting in wider areas, and to deploy the
platform anywhere [2–4]. This
technology is expected to combine the best features of both terrestrial and
satellite delivery mechanisms and to provide not only public services such as public
protection and disaster relief (PPDR), meteorological observation, and military
service but also various commercial telecommunication and broadcasting services
[5].
However, there is no HAPS put to
practical use yet in the world, since the development of the platform requires
state-of-the-art technology such as ultrathin fuel/solar cell, ultralight
weight fabric, durability against an extreme environment, high confidence and
high effectiveness component and so on [5, 6]. There are lots of technical
risks identified during the stage of platform development, and these risks
could increase the development time to reach the full broadband HAPS services,
but the appropriate stepping-stone-based strategy should help mitigate this
problem [7].
Perceiving those possibilities, many
countries are researching related technologies enabling HAPS to be practical
alternatives. In the US, Lockheed Martin is undertaking a project sponsored by Missile Defense Agency to
develop an airship which stays in the stratosphere and patrols the metropolitan
area. In Europe, CAPANINA project is going on to develop broadband telecommunication
system based on HAPS [3, 8, 9], and a consortium called as USE HAAS which
consists of more than 100 stakeholders has been organized to analyze the world
state of the art including HAAS aeronautical uses, to develop tentative
research objectives, and to define a technological roadmap based on the inputs
given by the end-users and the possible industrial partners [8, 10]. In the
CAPANINA project, Grace et al. [9, 11] investigate the viability of using
aerial platform technology to deliver broadband backhaul to high-speed trains,
using millimeter-wave band communications. Japan is one of the leading
countries in developing broadband telecommunication system based on HAPS.
Japanese engineers have demonstrated that HAPS can be a new platform to provide
HDTV service and IMT-2000 WCDMA service successfully [4, 12].
In Korea, the study on the possibility
of HAPS service started in 1998 by ETRI and KARI. After 2 years of research,
major research projects have been launched to develop technologies related to
HAPS services. In 2000, KARI and ETRI have started research projects to develop
an airship and a transmitter to be operated in stratosphere, respectively.
However, for the successful introduction of HAPS in the convergence market, it must resolve several
technical uncertainties including the duration of flight, quality of service, and
reliability as well as conflicts
with the existing terrestrial or satellite platforms. Also, the prevailing skepticism for the next-generation
services must be clarified [13, 14]. More than anything else, the
development of application services with HAPS and the clarification of its
economic feasibility should be performed in order to achieve successful
adoption of HAPS in the relevant market [2, 14].
The purpose of this paper is to provide the technoeconomic
feasibility study of introducing HAPS in Korean telecommunication market. In
more detail, an attempt is made to forecast the market size of HAPS services
based on the planned launching schedules of the HAPS platform in Korea.
By estimating the cost of providing the HAPS services as well as the revenues
obtainable from the business, the profitability of the HAPS services is examined.
2. Defining Service and Revenue Analysis
2.1. Business Model
As a broadcasting service
for HAPS, super HDTV which includes two-way HDTV, VOD, and DMB is considered as
a proper application service. As a telecommunication service for HAPS, HAPS 4G
services which include post-Wibro service and ubiquitous service are considered
as proper application services. Although PPDR and military service can be considered as
noncommercial services, this research confines application services with only
commercial ones.
Grace and Likitthanasate [15] suggested a business model for broadband services such
as backhaul, WLAN trains, broadband internet, broadcast/multicast, PPDR, and
remote sensing from HAPS, and showed that each service turns out to have
positive cash flow. Therefore the two services, super HDTV and 4G services,
defined in this study can be thought as future services evolved from the
broadband services in Grace and Likitthanasate [15].
The business model for broadcasting service is assumed as follows: a HAPS provider (or a model
company) rents HAPS platform to the broadcasting companies which would broadcast
their programs via HAPS platform. In this contract, broadcasting companies
should pay for rental fees to the HAPS provider and these rental fees are a part of the revenues. For telecommunication
services, it is assumed that the HAPS provider sells 4G services to the customers directly. Thus, the subscription and usage fees
gathered from HAPS subscribers are also a part of the revenues of the HAPS provider through the telecommunication services. Therefore, the
revenue of our model company consists of the broadcasting rental fees from the
broadcasting companies and telecommunication service revenue from the 4G
subscribers. This value chain is depicted in Figure 1. The sole domestic
satellite service provider, KT, in Korea has almost same business model as ours.
Figure 1: Value chain of the business model.
Grace
and Likitthanasate [15] adopted a business modeling approach from the two
perspectives: HAP operator and service providers. The HAP operator provides and
maintains the payloads, and the service providers are responsible for the
ground-user segment, billing system, and so on. Our model company integrates
HAP operator provider as well as service providers, except for
broadcast/multicast service.
2.2. Demand and Revenue Analysis
In estimating revenues, we classified HAPS
services into two categories such as telecommunication services and broadcasting services. In order to calculate the expected revenues from broadcasting
services under the aforementioned business model, the number of necessary
transponders and the level of transponder tariff (rental fee per payload)
should be estimated. In this paper, the numerical values of them were acquired
from the business data of the present satellite broadcasting market in Korea.
In order to calculate the expected revenues from
telecommunication services under the telecommunication business model, the
number of HAPS subscribers and average revenue per user (ARPU) estimates are
needed. In this paper, the number of HAPS subscribers is forecasted
analytically using diffusion-substitution model, and ARPU is assumed using the
business data of the present mobile telecommunication market in Korea.
In forecasting the HAPS subscribers, the following assumptions are made: (1) the number of 4G service subscribers
includes subscribers of all the broadband services regardless of the platform; (2)
the former service of 4G service is equivalent to so-called IMT-2000 and we
call it as 3G service; (3) the diffusion-substitution
process from 3G to 4G service would be similar to the transition from pager
service to mobile phone service in Korea, which implies 4G service would
replace 3G very rapidly; (4) the study period is from 2011 to 2020; (5) the
saturated level of subscribers is 35 million.
There might be
arguments that the assumption (3) is too simple. However, it is well known that the emergence of the mobile phone service replaced the
former pager service very rapidly in Korea. Thus, if we consider that 4G services would emerge along with the attractive and
advanced service concepts like telecommunication-broadcasting convergence, it may well forecast 4G
services’ rapid substitution for 3G services. This is why we adopted the assumption.
To analyze the demand transition
process from 3G to 4G services, we utilized the diffusion-substitution model of
Norton and Bass [4] and it can be written as follows:
(1) where
.
In (1), the subscript
implies the old generation service, and
is the new generation service.
denotes the cumulative number of subscribers for service
by time
,
denotes the potential saturated level of
subscribers for service
, and
is the market entry time of new service.
and
are parameters indicating interactions in the market.
The parameters of (1) were estimated using the nonlinear least square procedure
of SYSLIN in SAS with the data for annual number of subscribers of pager and mobile
phone services from 1985 to 2003. Table 1 shows the result of estimation.
Table 1: Estimation result of the substitution-diffusion model.
The
estimated value
, coefficient of innovation, is not significant, while the others are all
significant with
. Examinations of
values indicate very good fitness for both
equations. One intriguing result is the negative sign of
.
In general, the sign of
is expected to be positive, in cases that each
generation can do everything (and
possibly more) the previous generation could do,
and the market does follow the substitution of actual and potential
subscription from earlier generations
to later generations [16]. However, Norton and Bass [17] noted that the last
sometimes comes out negative but they offered
only the statement that they do not trust this last
very much.
On the other hand, Speece and Maclachlan [18] added more
positive interpretation that, in negative case, the new generation service does
replace the old one but does not increase the market potential. In addition, Chun and Ko [19] suggested that the
reason of negative sign might come from the fact that the potential demand
could be regarded not as in absolute value but in relative value compared with
the competitive service. We concluded that those explanations can be applied to
the result of this paper in the same
way.
In applying the above
estimation results to forecast 4G subscribers, we modified the potential market scale
considering the market expansion of 3G and 4G telecommunication services in
comparison with pager or mobile phone using the previously published
forecasting results of 3G subscribers in Table 2.
Table 2: Forecasting results of 3G services (unit: thousands) [
1].
Using the estimation
result of Table 1 as analogy values of parameters and the number of subscribers
of Table 2 as a data set, we forecasted the number of subscribers of 3G and 4G services
and the results are depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Demand forecasting of the 3G and 4G service subscribers.
As aforementioned
assumption, the forecasting result of 4G services in Figure 2 includes subscribers of all the
broadband services regardless of the platform. Therefore, to separate the
subscribers of only HAPS service among the total 4G subscribers, the penetration rate of HAPS service should be
obtained.
In this paper, the
penetration rate was calculated through benchmarking the current market
structure of Korean mobile phone market. Currently, three service providers—SK Telecom, KT Freetel, and LG Telecom—remain in the Korean mobile phone industry and
those three companies divide the total market
with the market share of 52% (SK Telecom), 32% (KT Freetel), and 16% (LG Telecom), respectively. We derive the
penetration rate as if one of the three companies would decide to utilize HAPS platform as a
means of providing 4G services to their customers. Thus, penetration rates used
in calculating the subscribers of HAPS service are 52%, 32%, 16%, and we call
them as aggressive, average, and conservative scenarios of HAPS demand,
respectively.
Assuming the penetration rate of HAPS service demand
as 52% (aggressive), 32% (average), 16% (conservative), the final HAPS service demand
forecasting results are depicted in Figure 3. In Figure 3, it is forecasted that the number of HAPS service subscribers will start from 120 thousands in 2011 and increase up to10 million in
2020.
Figure 3: HAPS service demand forecasting result.
To calculate the revenues of HAPS telecommunication
services, we assume ARPU as $35 per month which is the current APRU of mobile phone in
Korea [20] and multiply it by the number of
HAPS subscribers. In addition, we consider two more cases of ARPU, $30 as a cheaper scenario and $40 as an
expensive one. Consequently, the forecasted revenues from HAPS business are
obtained by summing broadcasting revenues and telecommunication revenues and
Figure 4 illustrates the
results.
Figure 4: Forecasted revenues
from HAPS business.
3. Cost Analysis of HAPS Services
Since HAPS is still in developing stage worldwide and
developers have been hesitant to release the cost information publicly, it is
hard to figure out or estimate the actual costs accurately. Thus, we have collected cost information of platforms and
facilities by informal interviews with the developers and experts in Korean research
institutes. The interviews were performed in several stages similarly to Delphi method. First, the cost items are defined by the group
discussion with the experts. In the next interview, the questionnaire shown in Table 3 is prepared and asked to fill out. Then, the results are reviewed by other
experts, and the cost is adjusted to obtain the final estimates.
Table 3: Sample questionnaire.
In addition, we adopt an analogy method to the satellite
services for other cost information since we have reasoned that the proportional breakdown of cost to
provide telecommunication services via HAPS would be similar to that of the satellite services. In particular,
we have quoted cost data of Mugunghwa satellite launched by Korean Telecommunication (KT) who is
a sole provider of satellite telecommunication service in Korea.
Although it is not straightforward to
define the detailed specifications of facilities in the early stage of the development,
at least general requirements of the facilities should be defined using the
technical terms in order to estimate the cost of facilities. The general
requirements of the target airship and transponder defined by the developers are
summarized in Table 4. In Table 4, operational requirements as well as the
airship specifications are defined.
Table 4: Key aspects of the airship and transponders.
According to the interviews with the developers of HAPS in Korea, they have anticipated to complete the development of HAPS by the end of 2010 and suggested a deployment plan as in Table 5. They have conjectured that it would take 6 years for full-scale deployment from 2011 until 2016 and 30 airships (5 spare), 3 control centers, and 8000 gap
fillers would be required to cover the entire region of Korea.
Table 5: Yearly required number of equipments and facilities.
It is known that a Korean mobile
telecommunication company operates 12 000
13 000 terrestrial base stations for
a nationwide coverage. Since a transponder can provide 500 beams, we may need
24
26 transponders for the same coverage. Thus, 25 transponders or airships are
assumed. In Figure 5, the potential cells covered by the 25 airships are displayed
in circles. The size of the each cell is determined with the wave angle of 20
30
degrees and varies depending on the population density. Since the number of
beams available by a single airship is fixed, the radius of area covered by a single
airship is smaller in densely populated area.
Figure 5: Airship deployment plan.
One control center is assumed to handle ten
airships, and the required number of gap fillers is quoted from the Korean satellite
DMB service company.
Based on the analogy mentioned above, we classified total
cost into two categories such as investment on facilities and operating costs.
Investment cost includes
investment on a fleet of airships equipped with transponders, ground facilities such as control
centers and launching facilities, and a number of gap fillers to cover the shadow regions.
Additional expenses including insurance cost, supervising cost, and incidental
expenses are accompanied. We do not consider R&D cost for developing HAPS since our focus is on
the service market, and the service providers would purchase necessary
equipments from the developers.
Based on the interviews, the major cost
items of the airship and their costs are summarized in Table 6 [6]. The manufacturing
cost of the first unit of airship is estimated as about $41.75M while the
manufacturing cost of the first unit of transponder is estimated as $15M.
Table 6: The estimated cost for the airship.
From the second unit of airship and
transponder, we have applied learning effect in estimating the manufacturing
cost. Learning effect is based on the concept that resources required to
produce each additional unit decline as the total number of units produced
increases. The learning effect can be expressed as a learning curve in
(2) where
unit value of the
th
unit,
first unit value,
unit number,
log
/log 2.
In applying (2), the value of
differs depending on the industry. According to the Cost
Estimation Handbook by NASA, the value of
is 0.85 for aerospace industry and 0.94 for electronics manufacturing. Thus,
we applied
0.85 and 0.94 for the airship
and transponder, respectively. The decreasing of manufacturing costs is shown
in Figure 6.
Figure 6: The
manufacturing cost reduction by the learning curve.
The cost of control center is
estimated to be $1M, and the unit price of gap filler is quoted as $50 000.
Also, the launching facility is expected
to be ready before 2011 and the estimated capital investment is $61.8M.
Operating Expenses include labor
costs, maintenance cost, utility cost, tax, general and administrative (G&A)
cost. Labor expenses are estimated by multiplying the sales estimation with the
average ratio of labor cost to total sales quoted from the balance sheet of KT for
the recent 3years. Maintenance cost and utility cost are estimated proportional
to cumulative investment. Tax is estimated as 10% of the sum of depreciation,
maintenance cost, and utility cost. G&A cost is estimated by multiplying
the sales estimation with the average ratio of G&A cost to total sales
quoted from the balance sheet of KT for the recent 3 years. On the other hand,
operating cost of launching facility is assumed to be 5% of total construction
cost per year and any royalty is not considered.
Based on the above estimation, the
total cost for each year is obtained by summing up the investment cost and
operating costs. The results are shown in Table 7 for the case with average
number of subscribers and monthly ARPU of $35. (The ARPU per month in Korean
mobile telecommunication market is about $35 in 2006.)
Table 7: Total cost for each year (average demand, ARPU = $35/month).
4. Economic Feasibility Analysis of HAPS
To perform economic feasibility analysis of HAPS service,
cash flow is calculated based on the revenues data and total cost of each year
presented in Figure 4 and Table 7. The basic assumption for the economic
feasibility analysis is as follows: (1) the minimum attractive rate of return
(MARR) is 8%; (2) the base period for the NPV analysis is year 2011.
The cash flow and profit for each year under average demand and ARPU of $35 per month are shown in Figure 7. Also, the results of economic feasibility analysis under
different demand conditions and ARPUs are summarized in Table 8 including NPV, internal rate of return (IRR), and payback period for
each scenario.
Table 8: Results of economic feasibility analysis.
Figure 7: Cash flow and profit (average demand, ARPU = $35/month).
As expected, the results in Table 8
show that IRR and NPV increase as the ARPU per month increases. Under average demand and ARPU of $35 per month, the first year with
profit is in year 2015, IRR is 31.9%,
and payback period is 2017, which implies that HAPS service is economically justifiable.
Table 8 also shows that all the 9 scenarios are economically justifiable since NPV is
positive, IRR is higher than MARR, and payback is within 10 years form
the service starting point.
Finally, since the estimated
costs are subject to change, sensitivity analysis on the cost is performed. The cost of
facilities may be larger or smaller than estimated costs as the detailed
requirements are available and by the advances in technology or development of
new materials. The effects of changes in investment costs on facilities are
analyzed assuming that the investment costs may either increase or decrease by
10%, respectively. The results are summarized in Table 9. If the cost decreases
by 10%, the overall profitability increases as expected but the payback periods
remain the same except the last case. The results of increase in cost by 10%
show similar trends except that the profitability reduces.
Table 9: Sensitivity analysis on the investment cost.
5. Conclusion
S-HDTV (100 Mbps, bidirectional) and 4G service (100 Mbps) can
be considered as proper application services for HAPS. A new broadcasting
provider is assumed to get the permission to use HAPS platform for S-HDTV. The
number of HAPS 4G subscribers is forecasted as 120 000 in 2011 and is growing
up to 10 million in 2020 under the average demand scenario. Assuming that ARPU for the 4G service is $35 per month in the average scenario, NPV is
calculated as $2,964 million, IRR becomes 31.9%, and payback occurs in 2017, which implies that HAPS
service is profitable in Korea.
However, we should be cautious to conclude that HAPS service is profitable in Korea. First, the
technological development would not advance as expected, which may threaten the provision of
HAPS and consequently delay the service schedule. Second, the cost and revenue forecasts
are subject to change. This study has been made in the very early stage when
there is no commercial HAPS system available in the world. Therefore, it is
very hard to obtain reliable data, which in turn reduce the accuracy of the
results. Third, risk factors are not explicitly included in the analysis.
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