Credit Default of Local Public Sectors in Chinese Government-Pay PPP Projects: Evidence from Ecological Construction

<table class="table-group" id="tab1"><tr><td><table class="table"><tr><td class="thead-hr" colspan="4"><hr/></td></tr><tr class="thead"><td class="align_left">Political performance</td><td class="align_center">Fiscal illusion</td><td class="align_center">Subjective willingness</td><td class="align_center">Objective limitation</td></tr><tr><td class="thead-hr" colspan="4"><hr/></td></tr><tr><td class="align_left">M1: political pressure</td><td class="align_center">M4: poor cognition</td><td class="align_center">M6: abuse of power</td><td class="align_center">M9: poor decision-making procedure</td></tr><tr><td class="align_left">M2: official corruption</td><td class="align_center">M5: unreasonable guarantee</td><td class="align_center">M7: repudiation of payment</td><td class="align_center">M10: lack of operational experience</td></tr><tr><td class="align_left">M3: public opposition</td><td class="align_left"> </td><td class="align_center">M8: response to policy changes</td><td class="align_center">M11: insufficient expertise in renegotiation</td></tr><tr class="table-tr"><td colspan="4"><hr class="tbody-hr"/></td></tr></table></td></tr></table>

<div>Logic of credit default for LPSs in Government-Pay PPP projects.</div>

Advances in Civil Engineering

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Table 1

Table 1: Credit Default of Local Public Sectors in Chinese Government-Pay PPP Projects: Evidence from Ecological Construction 