The Possibility of China’s Industrial Park Management Committee to Promote Interenterprise Cooperative Innovation in the Park: A Trilateral Evolutionary Game Perspective
Table 3
Model parameters’ plausible ranges.
Parameters
Description
Plausible ranges
The benefits earned by the park management committee when they participate in cooperation innovation
The percentage of the benefits earned by the management committee in choosing the “nonparticipation” strategy over “participation” strategy
The complementarity degree of the innovation resources shared by the main subjects
The degree of trust among the subjects
The share ratio coefficient of cooperative innovation income
The innovation income of core enterprises when they choose not to participate in cooperation
The innovation income of SMEs when they choose not to participate in cooperation
The total cost of the park management committee’s supervision and incentive measures
The initial innovation cost of core enterprises
The initial innovation cost of SMEs
The reduced amount on cost provided by the park management committee
22∼26
The fine core enterprises need to pay
20∼24
The fine SMEs need to pay
10∼14
The subsidy to core enterprises provided by the park management committee
15–34
The subsidy to SMEs provided by the park management committee
