Table of Contents Author Guidelines Submit a Manuscript
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Volume 2015, Article ID 958212, 14 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/958212
Research Article

The Optimal Multistage Effort and Contract of VC’s Joint Investment

School of Economic Mathematics, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Cheng Du 610074, China

Received 19 February 2015; Revised 11 July 2015; Accepted 26 July 2015

Academic Editor: Seenith Sivasundaram

Copyright © 2015 Meng Wu. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Linked References

  1. H. Xu, D. F. Wan, and J. Xu, “Venture capital syndication's member background organizational structure, and IPO underpricing: an empirical research based on the GEM of China,” Systems Engineering Theory and Practice, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 1–9, 2015. View at Google Scholar
  2. C. Casamatta and C. Haritchabalet, “Experience, screening and syndication in venture capital investments,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 368–398, 2007. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  3. T. Tykvová and A. Schertler, “Does syndication with local venture capitalists moderate the effects of geographical and institutional distance?” Journal of International Management, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 406–420, 2014. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  4. Y. V. Hochberg, A. Ljungqvist, and Y. Lu, “Whom you know matters: venture capital networks and investment performance,” The Journal of Finance, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 251–301, 2007. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  5. R. Elitzur and A. Gavious, “A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs,” European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 144, no. 2, pp. 440–453, 2003. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Zentralblatt MATH · View at MathSciNet · View at Scopus
  6. C. Casamatta, “Financing and advising: optimal financial contracts with venture capitalists,” Journal of Finance, vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 2059–2085, 2003. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  7. K. M. Schmidt, “Convertible securities and venture capital finance,” Journal of Finance, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1139–1166, 2003. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  8. T. Hellmann, “IPOs, acquisitions, and the use of convertible securities in venture capital,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 81, no. 3, pp. 649–679, 2006. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  9. T. Hellmann, “On the existence and uniqueness of pairwise stable networks,” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 211–237, 2013. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at MathSciNet · View at Scopus
  10. Y. F. Li and Z. F. Zhou, “An incentive contract model for venture capitalist based on the principal-agent relationship,” Chinese Journal of Management, vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 872–878, 2011. View at Google Scholar
  11. W. X. Guo and Y. Zeng, “Doublemoral hazard and the theory of capital structure of venture capital financing,” Journal of Management Sciences in China, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 119–131, 2009. View at Google Scholar
  12. J.-J. Zheng, P. Zhang, X.-S. Hu, and W.-L. Jiang, “Research on bidding strategy and modeling of equity auction based on stochastic differential equations,” System Engineering Theory and Practice, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 893–900, 2013. View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  13. W. A. Sahlman, “The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 473–521, 1990. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  14. A. Shliefer and R. W. Vishy, “Liquidation values and debt capacity: a market equilibrium approach,” The Journal of Finance, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 1343–1366, 1997. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar
  15. R. Y. Ying and Y. Q. Zhao, “An analysis of incentive mechanism and agent cost in venture capital,” Journal of Finance and Economics, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 22–29, 2004. View at Google Scholar
  16. W.-X. Guo, Y. Su, and Y. Zeng, “Capital structure of venture capital finance under double moral hazard and risk aversion of entrepreneur,” System Engineering Theory and Practice, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 408–418, 2010. View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  17. X. M. Liu, X. G. Wen, and L. L. Ding, “Study on double moral hazard prevention in venture capital,” Science and Technology Management Research, no. 5, pp. 212–215, 2010. View at Google Scholar
  18. B. Wu, X. X. Xu, and J. M. He, “Double-side moral hazard and convertible bond design in venture capital firms,” Journal of Management Sciences in China, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 11–21, 2012. View at Google Scholar
  19. H. Jiang and Z. H. Li, “Toward the compensation incentive in venture capital: based on multi principal agene model,” Modern Economic Sciences, vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 118–128, 2008. View at Google Scholar
  20. G. Y. Ai, J. Xu, and Y. Yu, “The reputation incentive mechanism of venture capital investment under relative performance evaluation,” Journal of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, vol. 41, no. 7, pp. 1134–1137, 2007. View at Google Scholar
  21. Y. Chan, “On the positive role of financial intermediation in allocation of venture capital in a market with imperfect information,” The Journal of Finance, vol. 38, no. 5, pp. 1543–1568, 1983. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar
  22. J. Xu, A. M. Wang, and H. M. Chen, “Research on control right incentive mechanism of venture capital based on reputation,” Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 67–71, 2007. View at Google Scholar
  23. P. Gompers and J. Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, USA, 1999.
  24. A. R. Admati and P. Peiderer, “Robust financial contracting and the role for venture capitalists,” Journal of Finance, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 371–402, 1994. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar
  25. S. Dahiya and K. Ray, “Staged investments in entrepreneurial financing,” Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 1193–1216, 2012. View at Publisher · View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  26. Y.-H. Jin, Y.-Q. Xi, and Z.-X. Ye, “Study of multi-period dynamic financial model of venture capital considering reputation,” System Engineering Theory and Practice, vol. 23, no. 8, pp. 76–80, 2003. View at Google Scholar · View at Scopus
  27. S. D. Zhang and X. D. Wei, “Analysis on multi-stage investment game of double moral hazard in venture capital,” Nankai Economic Studies, no. 6, pp. 142–150, 2008. View at Google Scholar
  28. R. K. Sah and J. E. Stiglitz, “The architecture of economic systems: hierarchies and polyarchies,” American Economic Review, vol. 76, pp. 716–727, 1986. View at Google Scholar
  29. X. L. Zhang and D. L. Yang, “The design of incentive contracts about syndication in venture capital,” Chinese Journal of Management Science, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 106–111, 2007. View at Google Scholar
  30. J. A. Brander, R. Amit, and W. Antweiler, “Venture capital syndication: improved venture selection versus the value added hypothesis,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 423–452, 2002. View at Google Scholar