Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and Corporate Sustainable Development: A Mediating Effect Analysis
Table 4
Panel OLS regression of the effect of corporate governance on corporate sustainable development.
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
State-owned enterprises
Private enterprises
Zscore
EPS
Zscore
EPS
BS
−0.243
−0.020
−0.384
−0.007
(−1.87)
(−1.80)
(−1.29)
(−0.69)
LNSALARY
−1.000
−0.010
−1.600
−0.040
(−3.72)
(−1.84)
(−2.74)
(−2.11)
IND
0.817
0.055
0.075
−0.018
(1.88)
(1.75)
(0.09)
(−0.61)
TOP
−0.002
−0.001
0.044
0.002
(−0.14)
(−1.01)
(1.50)
(2.08)
DAR
−0.198
−0.011
−0.249
−0.005
(−18.71)
(−12.00)
(−11.65)
(−7.26)
DIVR
0.006
0.001
−0.008
−0.003
(2.80)
(4.81)
(−1.51)
(−11.56)
DIV
1.849
1.365
1.159
1.897
(2.18)
(24.57)
(1.76)
(93.66)
FCF
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.26)
(1.03)
(0.09)
(1.25)
REVGROWTH
0.000
0.000
0.000
−0.000
(0.61)
(1.65)
(0.09)
(−0.79)
NIGROWTH
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(1.12)
(11.63)
(5.36)
(6.33)
AGE
−0.141
0.006
−0.224
0.004
(−3.23)
(1.16)
(−2.56)
(1.83)
LNREV
−1.643
0.144
−1.995
0.071
(−10.20)
(8.52)
(−5.53)
(6.93)
_cons
38.371
−2.372
42.498
−1.813
(7.73)
(−4.17)
(3.84)
(−6.32)
Firm
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
3450
3450
2125
2125
r2
0.308
0.309
0.321
0.596
This table presents panel OLS regressions of the effect of corporate governance on corporate sustainable development. Please see Table 1 for the variable description. After the Chow test, the LR test, and the Hausmann test, we choose the individual fixed-effect model. Firm-fixed effects are included in all regressions. t statistics in parentheses. p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.0.
