Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and Corporate Sustainable Development: A Mediating Effect Analysis
Table 5
Panel OLS regression of the effect of corporate governance on agency cost.
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
State-owned enterprises
Private enterprises
TAT
MER
TAT
MER
BS
−0.202
0.667
0.018
−0.048
(−2.37)
(2.17)
(3.17)
(−0.26)
IND
0.010
−2.902
0.003
0.017
(−0.66)
(−3.36)
(0.19)
(0.03)
LNSALARY
−0.032
3.017
0.026
−1.534
(−1.92)
(5.67)
(1.91)
(−3.44)
TOP
−0.004
0.127
−0.002
0.085
(−5.47)
(4.37)
(−2.35)
(3.94)
DIVR
−0.000
−0.000
0.000
−0.001
(−0.85)
(−0.10)
(0.10)
(−0.29)
DIV
0.030
−6.601
0.002
0.738
(1.88)
(−3.88)
(0.17)
(1.64)
DAR
0.002
−0.133
−0.001
0.072
(4.94)
(−6.43)
(−2.80)
(5.01)
FCF
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.59)
(2.31)
(0.97)
(0.79)
REVGROWTH
0.000
−0.010
0.000
−0.005
(7.13)
(−7.92)
(0.48)
(−5.61)
NIGROWTH
0.000
0.000
0.000
−0.000
(0.47)
(0.36)
(0.41)
(−4.57)
AGE
−0.014
0.210
−0.028
0.678
(−6.18)
(2.50)
(−9.92)
(7.41)
LNREV
0.238
−8.697
0.231
−7.918
(32.41)
(−27.69)
(21.46)
(−22.59)
_cons
−3.809
133.813
−3.932
184.008
(−15.53)
(13.96)
(−11.91)
(17.09)
Firm
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
3450
3450
2125
2125
r2
0.330
0.242
0.237
0.289
This table presents panel OLS regressions of the effect of corporate governance on agency cost. Please see Table 1 for the variable description. After the Chow test, the LR test, and the Hausman test, we choose the individual fixed effects model. Firm-fixed effects are included in all regressions. t statistics in parentheses. p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01.
