Table of Contents
Economics Research International
Volume 2010 (2010), Article ID 768546, 15 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2010/768546
Research Article

Walk the Talk? The Effect of Voting and Excludability in Public Goods Experiments

1Department of Social Sciences (Economics), University of Michigan-Dearborn, 4901 Evergreen Road, Dearborn, MI 48128, USA
2Department of Computing Sciences and Mathematics, Franklin University, 201 S. Grant Avenue, Columbus, OH 43215, USA

Received 20 June 2010; Revised 20 October 2010; Accepted 5 November 2010

Academic Editor: Thomas D. Crocker

Copyright © 2010 Hans J. Czap et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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