Table of Contents
Game Theory
Volume 2013 (2013), Article ID 754398, 12 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/754398
Research Article

A Tree Formulation for Signaling Games

Department of Economics, City University London, Northampton Square, London ECIV OHB, UK

Received 15 February 2013; Accepted 10 May 2013

Academic Editor: Dimitrios P. Tsomocos

Copyright © 2013 Xeni Dassiou and Dionysius Glycopantis. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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