Table of Contents
Game Theory
Volume 2014, Article ID 276489, 9 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/276489
Research Article

A Theory of Farsightedness in Committee Games

1MASS Laboratory, The University of Yaoundé 1, P.O. Box 47, Yaoundé, Cameroon
2THEMA Laboratory, University of Cergy Pontoise, 33 Boulevard du Port, 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, France

Received 11 October 2013; Revised 17 December 2013; Accepted 31 December 2013; Published 3 April 2014

Academic Editor: Jacqueline Morgan

Copyright © 2014 Alphonse Fodouop Fotso et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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