Table of Contents
Game Theory
Volume 2014 (2014), Article ID 435092, 8 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/435092
Research Article

On Taxed Matrix Games and Changes in the Expected Transfer

Fakultät für Mathematik und Informatik, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Ernst-Abbe-Platz 2, 07743 Jena, Germany

Received 19 May 2014; Revised 11 August 2014; Accepted 13 August 2014; Published 31 August 2014

Academic Editor: X. Henry Wang

Copyright © 2014 Ingo Althöfer and Marlis Bärthel. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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