Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Sequential versus Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games

<table>Numerical example (Cournot with strategic complements)—case <svg height="12.4375" id="M99" style="vertical-align:-0.1638pt" version="1.1" viewbox="0 0 47.712502 12.4375" width="47.712502" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
<g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,.062,12.162)"><path d="M452 333q0 -82 -46 -164t-116 -128q-81 -53 -158 -53q-26 0 -51 13t-37 32q-26 41 -6 134l91 431q7 40 2.5 47t-34.5 7h-33l2 25q36 4 72.5 13t58.5 15.5t28 6.5q10 0 4 -29l-91 -391h2q65 77 130 116.5t105 39.5q36 0 56.5 -32t20.5 -83zM365 316q0 76 -35 76
q-31 0 -93.5 -49t-107.5 -110q-12 -37 -17 -70q-9 -65 12 -96.5t59 -31.5q31 0 56 14q53 29 89.5 105t36.5 162z" id="x1D44F"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,12.744,12.162)"><path d="M535 323h-483v50h483v-50zM535 138h-483v50h483v-50z" id="x3D"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,27.447,12.162)"><path d="M384 0h-275v27q67 5 81.5 18.5t14.5 68.5v385q0 38 -7.5 47.5t-40.5 10.5l-48 2v24q85 15 178 52v-521q0 -55 14.5 -68.5t82.5 -18.5v-27z" id="x31"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,35.607,12.162)"><path d="M113 -12q-24 0 -39.5 16t-15.5 42q0 24 16 40.5t40 16.5t40 -16.5t16 -40.5q0 -26 -16 -42t-41 -16z" id="x2E"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,39.483,12.162)"><path d="M153 550l-26 -186q79 31 111 31q90 0 141.5 -51t51.5 -119q0 -93 -89 -166q-85 -69 -173 -71q-32 0 -61.5 11.5t-41.5 23.5q-18 17 -17 34q2 16 22 33q14 9 26 -1q61 -50 124 -50q60 0 93 43.5t33 104.5q0 69 -41.5 110t-121.5 41q-53 0 -102 -20l38 305h286l6 -8
l-26 -65h-233z" id="x35"></path></g>
</svg>. Red: coop. isoprofits;  blue: leader’s isoprofit; green: follower’s isoprofit.</table>

International Scholarly Research Notices

fig4

Figure 4

Figure 4: Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Sequential versus Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games 