Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Sequential versus Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games

<table>Numerical example (price competition with strategic complements)—case <svg height="12.4375" id="M167" style="vertical-align:-0.1638pt" version="1.1" viewbox="0 0 35.674999 12.4375" width="35.674999" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
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</svg>.   Red: coop. isoprofits; blue: leader’s isoprofit; green: follower’s isoprofit.</table>

International Scholarly Research Notices

fig5

Figure 5

Figure 5: Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Sequential versus Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games 