Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Sequential versus Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games

<table>Numerical example (Cournot with strategic substitutes)—case <svg height="12.4375" id="M219" style="vertical-align:-0.1638pt" version="1.1" viewbox="0 0 63.262501 12.4375" width="63.262501" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
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q0 -76 10 -138.5t37 -107.5t69 -45q32 0 55.5 25t35.5 68.5t17.5 91.5t5.5 105t-5.5 105.5t-18 92t-36 68t-56.5 24.5z" id="x30"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,12.931,12.162)"><path d="M512 -3l-437 233v51l437 233v-58l-378 -200v-2l378 -199v-58z" id="x3C"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,27.634,12.162)"><path d="M452 333q0 -82 -46 -164t-116 -128q-81 -53 -158 -53q-26 0 -51 13t-37 32q-26 41 -6 134l91 431q7 40 2.5 47t-34.5 7h-33l2 25q36 4 72.5 13t58.5 15.5t28 6.5q10 0 4 -29l-91 -391h2q65 77 130 116.5t105 39.5q36 0 56.5 -32t20.5 -83zM365 316q0 76 -35 76
q-31 0 -93.5 -49t-107.5 -110q-12 -37 -17 -70q-9 -65 12 -96.5t59 -31.5q31 0 56 14q53 29 89.5 105t36.5 162z" id="x1D44F"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,40.333,12.162)"><path d="M512 -3l-437 233v51l437 233v-58l-378 -200v-2l378 -199v-58z" id="x3C"></path></g><g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,55.036,12.162)"><path d="M384 0h-275v27q67 5 81.5 18.5t14.5 68.5v385q0 38 -7.5 47.5t-40.5 10.5l-48 2v24q85 15 178 52v-521q0 -55 14.5 -68.5t82.5 -18.5v-27z" id="x31"></path></g>
</svg>.    Red: coop. isoprofits; blue: leader’s isoprofit.</table>

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fig7

Figure 7

Figure 7: Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Sequential versus Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games 