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Journal of Applied Mathematics
Volume 2012, Article ID 379848, 12 pages
Research Article

The Core and Nucleolus in a Model of Information Transferal

Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands

Received 29 May 2012; Accepted 28 August 2012

Academic Editor: Marco H. Terra

Copyright © 2012 Dongshuang Hou and Theo Driessen. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.


Galdeano et al. introduced the so-called information market game involving n identical firms acquiring a new technology owned by an innovator. For this specific cooperative game, the nucleolus is determined through a characterization of the symmetrical part of the core. The nonemptiness of the (symmetrical) core is shown to be equivalent to one of each, super additivity, zero-monotonicity, or monotonicity.