An Uncertain Wage Contract Model with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

<table class="table-group" width="800px"><tr class="fig-image" id="a"><td><img alt="282867.fig.001a" src="https://static.hindawi.com/articles/jam/volume-2014/282867/figures/282867.fig.001a.jpg"/></td></tr><tr class="fig-caption"><td align="center"><table><tr><td><b>(a) </b>Optimal effort level with different <svg height="16.3125" id="M191" style="vertical-align:-3.27605pt" version="1.1" viewbox="0 0 15.0125 16.3125" width="15.0125" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
<g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,.062,12.162)"><path d="M480 416q0 -21 -18 -41q-9 -11 -17 -7q-20 9 -42 9q-62 0 -140 -78q23 -69 88 -192q17 -31 27 -42t20 -11q16 0 62 46l17 -20q-64 -92 -119 -92q-35 0 -70 66q-41 73 -84 187q-36 -30 -62 -61q-27 -115 -35 -172q-41 -8 -78 -20l-6 6l140 612q7 28 0.5 34t-37.5 7l-34 1
l5 26q38 4 74 13.5t57 17t25 7.5q12 0 4 -32l-104 -443h2q35 38 97 93q39 35 65.5 56t62 41.5t58.5 20.5q19 0 30.5 -10t11.5 -22z" id="x1D458"></path></g>
<g transform="matrix(.012,-0,0,-.012,8.612,16.25)"><path d="M384 0h-275v27q67 5 81.5 18.5t14.5 68.5v385q0 38 -7.5 47.5t-40.5 10.5l-48 2v24q85 15 178 52v-521q0 -55 14.5 -68.5t82.5 -18.5v-27z" id="x31"></path></g>
</svg></td></tr></table></td></tr><tr class="fig-image" id="b"><td><img alt="282867.fig.001b" src="https://static.hindawi.com/articles/jam/volume-2014/282867/figures/282867.fig.001b.jpg"/></td></tr><tr class="fig-caption"><td align="center"><table><tr><td><b>(b) </b>Optimal fixed wage with different <svg height="16.3125" id="M192" style="vertical-align:-3.27605pt" version="1.1" viewbox="0 0 15.0125 16.3125" width="15.0125" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
<g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,.062,12.162)"><path d="M480 416q0 -21 -18 -41q-9 -11 -17 -7q-20 9 -42 9q-62 0 -140 -78q23 -69 88 -192q17 -31 27 -42t20 -11q16 0 62 46l17 -20q-64 -92 -119 -92q-35 0 -70 66q-41 73 -84 187q-36 -30 -62 -61q-27 -115 -35 -172q-41 -8 -78 -20l-6 6l140 612q7 28 0.5 34t-37.5 7l-34 1
l5 26q38 4 74 13.5t57 17t25 7.5q12 0 4 -32l-104 -443h2q35 38 97 93q39 35 65.5 56t62 41.5t58.5 20.5q19 0 30.5 -10t11.5 -22z" id="x1D458"></path></g>
<g transform="matrix(.012,-0,0,-.012,8.612,16.25)"><path d="M384 0h-275v27q67 5 81.5 18.5t14.5 68.5v385q0 38 -7.5 47.5t-40.5 10.5l-48 2v24q85 15 178 52v-521q0 -55 14.5 -68.5t82.5 -18.5v-27z" id="x31"></path></g>
</svg></td></tr></table></td></tr><tr class="fig-image" id="c"><td><img alt="282867.fig.001c" src="https://static.hindawi.com/articles/jam/volume-2014/282867/figures/282867.fig.001c.jpg"/></td></tr><tr class="fig-caption"><td align="center"><table><tr><td><b>(c) </b>Optimal bonus coefficient with different <svg height="16.3125" id="M193" style="vertical-align:-3.27605pt" version="1.1" viewbox="0 0 15.0125 16.3125" width="15.0125" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
<g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,.062,12.162)"><path d="M480 416q0 -21 -18 -41q-9 -11 -17 -7q-20 9 -42 9q-62 0 -140 -78q23 -69 88 -192q17 -31 27 -42t20 -11q16 0 62 46l17 -20q-64 -92 -119 -92q-35 0 -70 66q-41 73 -84 187q-36 -30 -62 -61q-27 -115 -35 -172q-41 -8 -78 -20l-6 6l140 612q7 28 0.5 34t-37.5 7l-34 1
l5 26q38 4 74 13.5t57 17t25 7.5q12 0 4 -32l-104 -443h2q35 38 97 93q39 35 65.5 56t62 41.5t58.5 20.5q19 0 30.5 -10t11.5 -22z" id="x1D458"></path></g>
<g transform="matrix(.012,-0,0,-.012,8.612,16.25)"><path d="M384 0h-275v27q67 5 81.5 18.5t14.5 68.5v385q0 38 -7.5 47.5t-40.5 10.5l-48 2v24q85 15 178 52v-521q0 -55 14.5 -68.5t82.5 -18.5v-27z" id="x31"></path></g>
</svg></td></tr></table></td></tr><tr class="fig-image" id="d"><td><img alt="282867.fig.001d" src="https://static.hindawi.com/articles/jam/volume-2014/282867/figures/282867.fig.001d.jpg"/></td></tr><tr class="fig-caption"><td align="center"><table><tr><td><b>(d) </b>Optimal wage with different <svg height="16.3125" id="M194" style="vertical-align:-3.27605pt" version="1.1" viewbox="0 0 15.0125 16.3125" width="15.0125" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
<g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,.062,12.162)"><path d="M480 416q0 -21 -18 -41q-9 -11 -17 -7q-20 9 -42 9q-62 0 -140 -78q23 -69 88 -192q17 -31 27 -42t20 -11q16 0 62 46l17 -20q-64 -92 -119 -92q-35 0 -70 66q-41 73 -84 187q-36 -30 -62 -61q-27 -115 -35 -172q-41 -8 -78 -20l-6 6l140 612q7 28 0.5 34t-37.5 7l-34 1
l5 26q38 4 74 13.5t57 17t25 7.5q12 0 4 -32l-104 -443h2q35 38 97 93q39 35 65.5 56t62 41.5t58.5 20.5q19 0 30.5 -10t11.5 -22z" id="x1D458"></path></g>
<g transform="matrix(.012,-0,0,-.012,8.612,16.25)"><path d="M384 0h-275v27q67 5 81.5 18.5t14.5 68.5v385q0 38 -7.5 47.5t-40.5 10.5l-48 2v24q85 15 178 52v-521q0 -55 14.5 -68.5t82.5 -18.5v-27z" id="x31"></path></g>
</svg></td></tr></table></td></tr></table>

<table>Optimal contract with different parameter <svg height="16.3125" id="M190" style="vertical-align:-3.27605pt" version="1.1" viewbox="0 0 15.0125 16.3125" width="15.0125" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
<g transform="matrix(.017,-0,0,-.017,.062,12.162)"><path d="M480 416q0 -21 -18 -41q-9 -11 -17 -7q-20 9 -42 9q-62 0 -140 -78q23 -69 88 -192q17 -31 27 -42t20 -11q16 0 62 46l17 -20q-64 -92 -119 -92q-35 0 -70 66q-41 73 -84 187q-36 -30 -62 -61q-27 -115 -35 -172q-41 -8 -78 -20l-6 6l140 612q7 28 0.5 34t-37.5 7l-34 1
l5 26q38 4 74 13.5t57 17t25 7.5q12 0 4 -32l-104 -443h2q35 38 97 93q39 35 65.5 56t62 41.5t58.5 20.5q19 0 30.5 -10t11.5 -22z" id="x1D458"></path></g>
<g transform="matrix(.012,-0,0,-.012,8.612,16.25)"><path d="M384 0h-275v27q67 5 81.5 18.5t14.5 68.5v385q0 38 -7.5 47.5t-40.5 10.5l-48 2v24q85 15 178 52v-521q0 -55 14.5 -68.5t82.5 -18.5v-27z" id="x31"></path></g>
</svg>.</table>

Journal of Applied Mathematics

fig1

Figure 1

Figure 1: An Uncertain Wage Contract Model with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 