Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game

Table 1

Homogeneous population (all rounds).

	Data	CFS	(1)	(2)	(3)
	—	—		21.83	41.59
	—				0
(Predicted) avg. contributions
Overall endowments	37.91	39.38	39.41	60.24	37.91
	34.02	26.25	26.34	44.84	34.12
	24.53	35.00	35.03	55.68	37.67
	47.50	43.75	43.76	65.57	39.48
	45.57	52.50	52.50	74.86	40.36
			−8713.95	−3483.79	−3170.69
Obs.	960	960	960	960	960

This table reports average contributions as well as estimates and predictions from various specifications of the model based on the efficiency concerns assumption using all 20 rounds of the experiment. CFS refers to the specification not accounting for noise in subjects’ contributions while (1), (2), and (3) are Logit Quantal Response extensions of the model. In (1) and are constrained to 0.64 and 1, respectively. In (2), the value on is set to 0.64, while is estimated through (5). Finally, (3) refers to the unconstrained model in which both and are estimated through (5). The table also reports, for each specification, the corresponding log-likelihood. Confidence intervals are computed using an inversion of the likelihood-ratio statistic, at the 0.01 level, subject to parameter constraints.