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Journal of Advanced Transportation
Volume 2018 (2018), Article ID 2385936, 8 pages
Research Article

Research on Taxi Driver Strategy Game Evolution with Carpooling Detour

School of Traffic and Transportation, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou 730070, China

Correspondence should be addressed to Ruichun He; moc.361@namnart

Received 9 October 2017; Accepted 31 December 2017; Published 28 January 2018

Academic Editor: Giulio E. Cantarella

Copyright © 2018 Wei Zhang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.


For the problem of taxi carpooling detour, this paper studies driver strategy choice with carpooling detour. The model of taxi driver strategy evolution with carpooling detour is built based on prospect theory and evolution game theory. Driver stable strategies are analyzed under the conditions of complaint mechanism and absence of mechanism, respectively. The results show that passenger’s complaint mechanism can effectively decrease the phenomenon of driver refusing passengers with carpooling detour. When probability of passenger complaint reaches a certain level, the stable strategy of driver is to take carpooling detour passengers. Meanwhile, limiting detour distance and easing traffic congestion can decrease the possibility of refusing passengers. These conclusions have a certain guiding significance to formulating taxi policy.