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Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Volume 2015 (2015), Article ID 690807, 7 pages
Research Article

Optimal Contract Design for Cooperative Relay Incentive Mechanism under Moral Hazard

Hubei Collaborative Innovation Center for High-Efficiency Utilization of Solar Energy, Hubei University of Technology, Wuhan 430068, China

Received 10 June 2015; Revised 31 August 2015; Accepted 4 October 2015

Academic Editor: George S. Tombras

Copyright © 2015 Nan Zhao et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.


Cooperative relay can effectively improve spectrum efficiency by exploiting the spatial diversity in the wireless networks. However, wireless nodes may acquire different network information with various users’ location and mobility, channels’ conditions, and other factors, which results in asymmetric information between the source and the relay nodes (RNs). In this paper, the relay incentive mechanism between relay nodes and the source is investigated under the asymmetric information. By modelling multiuser cooperative relay as a labour market, a contract model with moral hazard for relay incentive is proposed. To effectively incentivize the potential RNs to participate in cooperative relay, the optimization problems are formulated to maximize the source’s utility while meeting the feasible conditions under both symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios. Numerical simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed contract design scheme for cooperative relay.