Analysis of Denial of Service Impact on Data Routing in Mobile eHealth Wireless Mesh Network

Table 1

Comparison of the available solutions.

Reference	Mechanism	Tackled attacks	Security analysis	Limitations
WRSR [5]	Statistical based: neighbors’ information and existing of alternative path	Wormhole	Simulation with strong adversary scenario	Inefficient protection due to limited number of attacks handled
WSRPHWM [6]	Cryptography based and past communication statistics	Spoofed route signaling; Replay attack; Black hole; Wormhole; Grey hole; Routing disruption	Theoretical	(i) Additional resources are required which is a certification authority; (ii) Overhead due to usage of public key cryptography
CSROR [7]	Past communication statistics	Wormhole, black hole, and grey hole	Not provided	Inefficient protection due to limited number of attacks handled
E-SRPM [8]	Link’s length information and random walk route scheme	Wormhole	Simulation	Inefficient protection due to limited number of attacks handled
ARANA [9]	Cryptography based	Malicious packets manipulation	Simulation	(i) Additional resources are required which is a certification authority; (ii) Overhead due to usage of public key cryptography; (iii) Inefficient protection due to limited number of attacks handled
SAODV [10]	Cryptography based	Malicious packets manipulation of routing metric and nodes impersonation	Simulation	(i) Additional resources are required which is a certification authority; (ii) Overhead due to usage of public key cryptography; (iii) Inefficient protection due to limited number of attacks handled
I-SEAD [11]	Cryptography based	Malicious routing update	Simulation	Inefficient protection due to limited number of attacks handled
SAR [12]	Cryptography based	Route discovery process	Theoretical	(i) Additional resources are required which is a certification authority; (ii) Overhead due to usage of public key cryptography; (iii) Inefficient protection due to limited number of attacks handled
Leak detector [13]	Statistical based: neighbors’ information and existence of alternative path	Selective forwarding and black hole	Simulation	(i) Inefficient protection due to limited number of attacks handled; (ii) Complexity due to required integration in existing routing protocol
SeRWA [14]	Neighbor information and cryptography based	Wormhole	Simulation	(i) Additional resources are required to distribute keys; (ii) Inefficient protection due to limited number of attacks handled
CRP [15]	Statistical based: neighbor information and public key cryptography	Black hole, grey hole, packet tampering, rushing attack, and collusion attack	Simulation	(i) Additional resources are required which is a certification authority; (ii) Overhead due to usage of public key cryptography; (iii) Inefficient protection due to limited number of attacks handled
PASER [16]	Cryptography based and GPS location	Wormhole and cryptographic protection (message and node authentication, message freshness, and message confidentiality)	Simulation	(i) Additional resources are required which is a certification authority and GPS hardware; (ii) Overhead due to usage of public key cryptography