Strategic Bidding Behaviors in Nondecreasing Sponsored Search Auctions

<table class="table-group" width="800px"><tr class="fig-image" id="a"><td><img alt="206386.fig.003a" src="https://static.hindawi.com/articles/mpe/volume-2013/206386/figures/206386.fig.003a.jpg"/></td></tr><tr class="fig-caption"><td align="center"><table><tr><td><b>(a) </b>The utility comparison of the malicious advertisers</td></tr></table></td></tr><tr class="fig-image" id="b"><td><img alt="206386.fig.003b" src="https://static.hindawi.com/articles/mpe/volume-2013/206386/figures/206386.fig.003b.jpg"/></td></tr><tr class="fig-caption"><td align="center"><table><tr><td><b>(b) </b>The utility comparison of the selective advertisers</td></tr></table></td></tr><tr class="fig-image" id="c"><td><img alt="206386.fig.003c" src="https://static.hindawi.com/articles/mpe/volume-2013/206386/figures/206386.fig.003c.jpg"/></td></tr><tr class="fig-caption"><td align="center"><table><tr><td><b>(c) </b>The utility comparison of the conservative advertisers</td></tr></table></td></tr></table>

<table>Advertisers’ utilities obtained by different vindictive bidding strategies.</table>

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Figure 3

Figure 3: Strategic Bidding Behaviors in Nondecreasing Sponsored Search Auctions 