A Mixed 0-1 Linear Programming Approach to the Computation of All Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria of a Finite n-Person Game in Normal Form

Table 3

The payoff function 𝑢^𝑖(𝑠^𝑖_𝑗,𝑠^−𝑖) is generated from 0 to 100 randomly.

Prob.	Num𝑁	Num𝑆	NumEquilibra	Time (s)
1	3	3	0	0.41
2	3	3	2	0.45
3	3	4	2	0.51
4	3	5	0	0.49
5	3	5	2	0.61
6	3	7	0	0.56
7	3	7	2	0.41
8	3	8	0	0.61
9	3	8	2	0.89
10	3	8	2	0.68
11	3	10	1	1.11
12	3	12	1	4.00
13	3	13	1	2.64
14	3	13	2	2.64
15	3	16	0	14.25
16	3	19	4	25.70
17	3	22	4	55.94
18	3	24	2	132.87
19	3	24	1	142.96
20	3	25	2	246.76
21	3	26	2	499.40
22	3	28	0	804.76
23	3	28	1	671.67
24	3	30	2	1382.03
25	3	32	1	2821.16
26	3	34	2	3325.67
27	3	37	1	7088.06
28	3	38	2	9395.13
29	3	41	2	20441.10
30	3	43	0	29204.70