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Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Volume 2014 (2014), Article ID 835254, 8 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/835254
Research Article

Research on Multiprincipals Selecting Effective Agency Mode in the Student Loan System

1College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China
2School of Economics, University of Jinan, Jinan 250022, China

Received 19 February 2014; Accepted 9 April 2014; Published 8 May 2014

Academic Editor: Ming Gao

Copyright © 2014 Libo Ding et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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