Optimal Ordering and Disposing Policies in the Presence of an Overconfident Retailer: A Stackelberg Game

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Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Figure 10

Figure 10: Optimal Ordering and Disposing Policies in the Presence of an Overconfident Retailer: A Stackelberg Game 