| role user (Ui, RC, ASj: agent, | | SKey1 : symmetric_key, | | SKey2 : symmetric_key, | | H, MUL, SUB: hash_func, | | Snd, Rcv: channel(dy)) | | played_by Ui | | def= | | local State : nat, | | IDi, PWi, IDj, N, Ej, Yj: text, | | Di, Ei, Fi, Ai, Bi, Ci, Ri, M1, M2, M3, M4, M6, Rij, Rj, M5, | | SKi: message, | | Inc : hash_func | | const user_rserver, rserver_aserver, | | aserver_user, sec1, sec2, sec3, sec4, sec5, sec6: protocol_id | | init State ≔0 | | transition | | 1. State = 0 ∧ Rcv(start) | | State＇ ≔ 1 ∧ Ai＇ ≔ h(IDi.PWi) | | ∧ Snd(IDi.Ai＇}_SKey2) | | 2. State = 1 ∧ Rcv(Di＇.Ei＇.Fi＇.N＇}_SKey2) | | State＇ ≔ 2 ∧ Ci＇ ≔ exp(IDi, Ai) | | ∧ Bi＇ ≔ xor(Di＇,Ci＇) | | ∧ Ri＇ ≔new() | | ∧ M1＇ ≔h(Bi＇.Ri＇) | | ∧ M2＇ ≔ xor(h(Bi＇), Ri＇) | | ∧ Snd(M1＇.M2＇.Fi.IDj) | | ∧ secret(PWi}, sec1, Ui}) | | 3. State = 2 ∧ Rcv(Ej＇.M3＇) | | State＇ ≔ 3 ∧ Yj＇ ≔ xor(M3＇,IDi) | | ∧ M4＇ ≔ h(IDi. Ri. Yj＇.IDj) | | ∧ M5＇ ≔exp((IDi.Ri.M4＇), Ej) | | ∧ Snd(M5＇) | | ∧ secret(Yj＇}, sec2, Ui,ASj,RC}) | | ∧ witness(ASj, Ui, aserver_user, Ri) | | 4. State = 3 ∧ Rcv(M6＇,Rij＇) | | State＇ ≔ 4 ∧ Rj＇ ≔ xor(Rij,Ri) | | ∧ SKi＇ ≔ h(IDi.IDj.Ri.Rj＇) | | ∧ secret(SKi}, sec3, Ui,ASj}) | | end role |
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