Security and Communication Networks

Research Article

Exploiting Proximity-Based Mobile Apps for Large-Scale Location Privacy Probing

Table 1

Examination results of popular NS apps.


APP	Originating place	Downloads (million)		Location accuracy in APP	Transport protocol	Request encryption	Location accuracy & other information in response data
APP	Originating place	Google Play¹	360 Android Market²	Location accuracy in APP	Transport protocol	Request encryption	Location accuracy & other information in response data

Badoo	UK	100–500	0.81	None	Unknown	N/A	N/A
LOVOO	Germany	10–50	0.24	0.1 mi radius	HTTPS without SSL pinning	signature	100 m radius & last time
MeetMe	USA	10–50	0.08	100 m radius	HTTP with plaintexts	none	100 m radius
Mitalk	China	0.5–1	130	100 m radius	HTTP with plaintexts	checksum	10 m radius
Momo	China	1–5	1397	10 m radius	HTTPS without SSL pinning	none	1 m radius
Skout	USA	10–50	1.5	1000 m radius	HTTP with plaintexts	none	0.01 m radius
Tinder	USA	50–100	0.67	0.1 mi radius	HTTP with plaintexts	none	0.1 mi radius
Wechat	China	100–500	13463	100 m radius	Unknown	N/A	N/A
Weibo	China	10–50	4436	100 m radius	HTTP with plaintexts	none	0.00001° coordinate (1 m) & last time

Most people in Chinese Mainland download Android apps from third-party markets because Google Play is inaccessible there; ²one of the largest Android third-party markets in China provided by Qihoo 360 Company (NYSE:QIHU).