Mobile IPv6 Vertical Handover Specifications, Threats, and Mitigation Methods: A Survey

Table 2

Summary of infrastructure-less security.

Infrastructure-less security	Main operation	Main strength	Main weakness
CAM [102, 111]	Correspondence with the generated key pair at the initialization phase	Defence against falsification attack	The protocol cannot ensure MN node reliability
caTBUA [112, 113]	Using context information to validate an appropriate CoA dynamically	It outperforms the existing BU authentication protocols	Requires more information to build the context
IBS [88]	It includes two security primitives: encryption and signature	Ensures two-way origin authentication	Requires comparing levels of security
UDHBU [114]	It utilizes the signalling on a low-layer level to exchange DH variables	It does not require having preestablished SAs between relevant MAGs	Vulnerable to DoS, MITM, and false BU attacks
SDR [104]	Home registration and correspondent registration	Defence against rerun attack, false BU message, and MiTM attacks	The registration requires time
PKBU [115]	Provide a cryptographic binding between the CN and MN	The address ownership is assured	It does not cover the CoA ownership
OEAP [109]	Incorporating the OAE based on the random oracle model to provide both security and efficiency	Involves fewer security computations than the other BU schemes	Introduces high computational work