Research Article
Differential Game and Simulation Study on Management Synergy of Regional Coal Mine Emergencies in China
Table 1
Parameters of differential game models of the central government, the local government, and coal mine enterprises.
| Symbol of parameter | Description of parameter |
| T | Time | K | Diffusion coefficient | Γ | Amount of reduced loss per unit effort | C1 | Cost coefficient of the local government for coal mine emergencies | C2 | Emergency cost coefficient for coal mine enterprises in sudden disasters | Α | Benefit brought to the local government per unit reduced accident loss | Β | Benefits brought to coal mine enterprises per unit reduced accident loss | Η | Degree of rewards and punishments by the central government for the local ones | Μ | Degree of reward and punishments by the local government for the mine enterprises | εc | Degree of emergency supervision by the local government | ει | Degree of emergency supervision by the central government | | Emergency performance level coefficient of the central government | | Emergency performance level coefficient of the local government | Θ | Coefficient of unit loss caused by sudden coal mine accident to the local government | Π | Coefficient of unit loss caused by sudden coal mine accident to the coal mine enterprises |
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