Comparative Study on Various Authentication Protocols in Wireless Sensor Networks

Table 2

Information about different authentication protocols in wireless sensor networks.

Techniques	Author and reference	Year	Performance	Quality measurement
Lightweight authentication protocols
Lightweight authentication protocol (LAP) for smart dust WSNs	Sharifi et al. [46]	2009	LAP employs comparatively fewer keys to accomplish security for nodes before deployment and minimizes the communication overhead	() Less computational requirements; () Less communication requirements; () Less overhead
Lightweight authentication scheme for WSNs	Delgado-Mohatar et al. [14]	2011	This scheme employs symmetric cryptography and encryption algorithm to provide perfect resilience against various attacks	() Smaller number and length of the exchanged messages; () Low power consumption; () Better scalability
Lightweight authentication for recovery in WSNs	Li et al. [47]	2009	This scheme is used to recluster and reprogram the nodes in a WSN	() Low execution time; () Minimum number of verifications
Lightweight protocol	Shah et al. [48]	2014	This protocol utilizes Fermat Number Transform (FNT) and Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) for enabling secure communication	() Minimum memory utilization; () Data confidentiality; () Anonymity; () Instant authentication; () Mutual authentication; () Data integrity; () Data freshness
LSec: Lightweight Security protocol for WSN	Shaikh et al. [49]	2006	LSec offers authentication and authorization of sensor nodes. Also, it provides simple key exchange scheme and data confidentiality	() Less memory requirement; () Low transmission cost
Lightweight security framework	Zia and Zomaya [50]	2011	This mechanism ensures a sensor node to base station and also has better total security for WSNs	() Packet transmission time; () Low latency; () Less packet overheads
Self-key establishment protocol for WSNs	Sharifi et al. [51]	2009	SKEW uses a refreshing mechanism for offering greater security. It does not need a particular key server for key broadcasting	() Less communication overhead; () Reducing energy consummation; () Less memory usage; () Scalability; () Local connectivity; () Global connectivity
Key management protocols
LEAP: localized encryption and authentication protocol	Zhu et al. [20]	2006	Based on the use of one-way key chains, LEAP comprises an efficient protocol for local broadcast authentication. It maximize the difficulty of introducing various security attacks on WSN	() Low computational cost; () Low communication cost; () Less storage requirement
BROSK: broadcast session key	Camtepe and Yener [52]	2005	BROSK uses master key for establishing session key. It is the master key based key distribution solutions	() Less memory requirements; () Very low resilience
LKHW: logical key hierarchical for wireless sensor networks	Pietro et al. [53]	2003	LKHW offers secure multicasting using an extension of the directed diffusion protocol. It also supports both backward and forward secrecy	() Robustness in routing; () Robustness in security
Random key distribution scheme	Du et al. [54]	2004	This scheme uses the deployment knowledge and accomplishes the level of connectivity. It also enhances the resilience of the network against node capture	() Less communication overhead; () Network resilience
Pairwise keys in sensor networks	Liu et al. [2]	2005	This system enables sensor nodes to communicate securely with each other via the cryptographic methods	() Resource constrained; () Low storage; () Low communication overhead; () Low computation overhead
MAC-based broadcast authentication protocols
Multiple TESLA	Perrig et al. [55]	2005	This protocol addresses the scalability of TESLA minimizing the congestion load using distributed and secure time servers	() Low space overhead; () Less authentication delay
μTESLA	Ullah et al. [56]	2011	This protocol saves energy by minimizing the size of transmitted packets	() High computation power; () High communication bandwidth; () Less memory requirements
Multilevel μTESLA	Liu and Ning [57]	2004	This scheme offers a solution for the unicast bootstrapping problem of μTESLA. It also makes broadcasts scalable to a new receiver	() Fault tolerance; () DoS tolerance; () Less computation overhead
Scalable μTESLA	Liu et al. [58]	2005	This scheme improves scalability by maximizing the number of senders. For the distribution of initial parameters and commitments, the Merkle hash tree is used in μTESLA	() Time synchronization; () Less storage overhead
Regular predictable TESLA (RPT)	Luk et al. [59]	2006	RPT offers an immediate solution to the authentication delay problem	() Time synchronization
BABRA	Zhou and Fang [60]	2006	This scheme is based on μTESLA symmetric key broadcast authentication mechanism using delayed key disclosure. It uses the similar batch key for all messages transmitted during a specific communication period	() Time synchronization; () Infinite number of keys; () Low packet loss
Unbounded one-way chains	Groza [61]	2008	This scheme overcomes the limitation of length of key chains in standard TESLA using squaring function	() Scalability; () Reliability; () Less bootstrapping overhead
Long duration TESLA	Liu et al. [62]	2012	This protocol modifies the creation of the key chain and also overcomes the limited length of one-way key chain used in μTESLA	() Less execution time
TESLA++	Studer et al. [63]	2009	In this protocol, only the MAC of the message is broadcast with the index number of the recent key	() Less memory/space; requirement
Localized TESLA (L-TESLA)	Drissi and Gu [64]	2006	This minimizes the authentication delay by partitioning a large network to multiple smaller subsets	() Low verification delay; () Less broadcast overhead; () Low broadcast delay
Extended TESLA (X-TESLA)	Kwon and Hong [65]	2010	The major purpose of this protocol is to save energy and avoid data-memory trade-off attacks	() Reducing memory consumption