Table of Contents
Game Theory
Volume 2014 (2014), Article ID 276489, 9 pages
Research Article

A Theory of Farsightedness in Committee Games

1MASS Laboratory, The University of Yaoundé 1, P.O. Box 47, Yaoundé, Cameroon
2THEMA Laboratory, University of Cergy Pontoise, 33 Boulevard du Port, 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, France

Received 11 October 2013; Revised 17 December 2013; Accepted 31 December 2013; Published 3 April 2014

Academic Editor: Jacqueline Morgan

Copyright © 2014 Alphonse Fodouop Fotso et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.


We study the committee decision making process using game theory. A committee here refers to any group of people who have to select one option from a given set of alternatives under a specified rule. Shenoy (1980) introduced two solution concepts, namely, the one-core and a version of bargaining set for committee games. Shortcomings of these solutions concepts are raised and discussed in this paper. These shortcomings are resolved by introducing two new solutions concepts: the farsighted one-core and the bargaining set revised, inspired by an idea of farsightedness initially defined by Rubinstein (1980). It is shown that the farsighted one-core is always non-empty and is better than the one-core. In a well-specified sense, the bargaining set revised is also better than the bargaining set as defined by Shenoy (1980) and it is always non-empty for simple committee games with linear preferences. Other attractive properties are also proved.