Table of Contents
Game Theory
Volume 2014 (2014), Article ID 617596, 4 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/617596
Research Article

Nash Equilibria in Large Games

Department of Economics, City University, London EC1V 0HB, UK

Received 30 October 2013; Accepted 14 February 2014; Published 18 March 2014

Academic Editor: Walter Briec

Copyright © 2014 Dionysius Glycopantis. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Abstract

This paper adds to the discussion, in a general setting, that given a Nash-Schmeidler (nonanonymous) game it is not always possible to define a Mas-Colell (anonymous) game. In the two games, the players have different strategic behaviours and the formulations of the two problems are different. Also, we offer a novel explanation for the lack of a Nash equilibrium in an infinite game. We consider this game as the limit of a sequence of approximate, finite games for which an equilibrium exists. However, the limiting pure strategy function is not measurable.