Table of Contents
ISRN Communications and Networking
Volume 2012, Article ID 913294, 8 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.5402/2012/913294
Research Article

Approximate Core Allocation for Large Cooperative Security Games

1University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA
2University of Illinois, Champaign, IL, USA

Received 2 September 2012; Accepted 24 September 2012

Academic Editors: S. Cheng, T. Erseghe, W. Jiang, and V. Tralli

Copyright © 2012 Saman Zonouz and Parisa Haghani. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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