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| Prot. | Network model | Goals | Main processes | Performances (+) and limitations (−) |
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| Kumari et al. (2016) [68] | Wireless sensor network (WSN) with the service seeker users, sensing component sensor nodes (SNs) and the service provider base-station or gateway node (GWN) | Providing mutual authentication with forward secrecy and wrong identifier detection mechanism at the time of login | (i) Initialization phase;
(ii) User registration phase;
(iii) Login phase;
(iv) Authentication & key agreement phase;
(v) Password change phase | + The user is anonymous.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, user impersonation attack, password guessing attack, replay attack, stolen verifier attack, smart card loss attack, session-specific temporary information attack, GWN Bypass attack, and privileged insider attack.
+ Provides a secure session-key agreement and forward secrecy.
+ Provides freely password changing facility.
+ Efficient in unauthorized login detection with wrong identity and password.
− The data integrity is not considered |
|
| Chung et al. (2016) [69] | Wireless sensor networks for roaming service | Providing an enhanced lightweight anonymous authentication to resolve the security weaknesses of the scheme [60] | (i) Registration phase;
(ii) Login and authentication phase;
(iii) Password change phase | + Considers anonymity, hop-by-hop authentication, and untraceability.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, password guessing attack, impersonation attack, forgery attack, known session key attack, and fair key agreement.
− Location privacy is not considered |
|
| Gope and Hwang (2016) [71] | Real-time data access in WSNs | Ensuring the user anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, and resiliency of stolen smart card attacks | (i) Registration phase;
(ii) Anonymous authentication and key exchange phase;
(iii) Password renewal phase;
(iv) Dynamic node addition phase | + Considers the user anonymity and untraceability.
+ Provides perfect forward secrecy.
+ Security assurance in case of lost smart card.
+ Resilience against node capture attack and key compromise impersonation Attack.
− The average message delay and the verification delay are not evaluated |
|
| Chang and Le (2016) [73] | Users, sensor nodes, and gateway node in WSN | Providing mutual authentication and perfect forward secrecy | (i) Registration phase;
(ii) Authentication phase;
(iii) Password changing phase | + Considers the session key security, perfect forward secrecy, and user anonymity.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, replay attack and smart card lost attack.
+ Efficient in terms of computation cost in the authentication phases compared to the schemes [42, 50, 51, 211].
− Privacy-preserving is not analyzed compared to the GLARM scheme [61]. |
|
| Jiang et al. (2016) [74] | Users, sensor nodes, and gateway node in WSN. | Providing mutual authentication, anonymity, and untraceability | (i) Registration phase;
(ii) Login and authentication phase | + Provides mutual authentication, session key agreement, user anonymity, and user untraceability.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, smart card attack, impersonation attack, modification attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and tracking attack.
− Wormhole attack and blackhole attack are not considered |
|
| Farash et al. (2016) [75] | Users, sensor nodes, and gateway node in WSN | Providing the user authentication with traceability protection and sensor node anonymity | (i) Predeployment phase;
(ii) Registration phase;
(iii) Login and authentication phase;
(iv) Password change phase | + Efficient in terms of communication, computation and storage cost compared to the scheme [51]
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, replay attack, privileged-insider attack, man-in-the-middle attack, insider and stolen verifier attack, smart card attack, impersonation attack, bypassing attack, many logged-in users with the same login-id attack, password change attack, and DoS attack.
− Wormhole attack and blackhole attack are not considered |
|
| Kumari et al. (2016) [76] | Users, sensor nodes, and gateway node in WSN | Providing the mutual authentication with traceability and anonymity | (i) Offline sensor node registration phase;
(ii) User registration phase;
(iii) Login phase;
(iv) Authentication and key agreement phase;
(v) Password update phase;
(vi) Dynamic sensor node addition phase | + Efficient in terms of end-to-end delay (EED) (in seconds) and throughput (in bps).
+ Efficient in terms of computation cost in login and authentication phases compared to both schemes Turkanović et al. [51] and Farash et al. [75].
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, replay attack, stolen smart card attack, privileged-insider attack, offline password guessing attack, impersonation attack, and sensor node capture attack.
− Wormhole attack and blackhole attack are not considered.
− Lack nonrepudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [64]. |
|
| Sun et al. (2016) [145] | Multicast communications in WSNs, including, sink and many groups, and each group has a powerful node and many low ordinary nodes | Providing the broadcast authentication and enhanced collusion resistance | (i) Initialization;
(ii) Broadcast;
(iii) Group keys’ recovery and pairwise keys’ updating;
(iv) Node addition;
(v) Node revocation | + Collusion resistance
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, PKE-attack and PF-attack.
− The end-to-end delay and throughput are not evaluated compared to the scheme [76].
− Replay attack is not considered |
|
| Jiang et al. (2017) [77] | Users, sensor nodes, and gateway node in WSN | Achieving mutual authentication among the communicating agents with user anonymity and untraceability | (i) Registration phase;
(ii) Login phase;
(iii) Authentication phase;
(iv) Password change phase | + Resistance to attacks, stolen-verifier attack, guessing attack, impersonation attack, modification attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and replay attack.
− The end-to-end delay and throughput are not evaluated compared to the scheme [76].
− Collusion resistance is not considered compared to the scheme [145] |
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