|
| Country | App name | Data collection (server side) | Data retention (h = hour, d = day, m = month, y = year) | Data access (server side) |
|
| Austria | Stopp Corona [56] | UUIDs, smartphone numbers of infected users | (i) UUIDs, smartphone numbers of infected users: 30 d (server)
(ii) UUIDs, encounter details: 14 d (smartphone) | Austrian Red Cross |
|
| Bulgaria | ViruSafe [60] | Smartphone number, personal ID number or passport number, age, gender, chronic illnesses, answers to personal status questions, location of the smartphone | (i) All data stored for the duration of the state emergency period | Ministry of Health, authorised governmental institutions with a digital certificate, doctors |
|
| Croatia | Stop COVID-19 [69] | UUIDs of infected users, verification codes | (i) UUIDs of infected users: unknown (server)
(ii) Verification codes: 14 d (server)
(iii) UUIDs, encounter details: 14 d (smartphone) | Ministry of Health |
|
| Cyprus | CovTracer [66] | Geolocation data of infected users (last 2 weeks), name, address, date of birth, reason(s) of moving per occasion, phone number, email, password | (i) All data stored for 1 y | Personal data only accessible by RISE, geolocation data shared with Cypriot epidemiologists |
|
| Czech Republic | eRouska [68] | Smartphone numbers, encounter details of infected users | (i) Smartphone numbers: 6 m
(ii) Encounter details of infected users: 12 h
(iii) Data on smartphone: 30 d | Ministry of Health, regional health authorities |
|
| Denmark | Smittestop [72] | NemIDs and UUIDs of infected users | (i) NemIDs of infected users: 24 h (server)
(ii) UUIDs of infected users: 14 d (server)
(iii) UUIDs, encounter details: 14 d (smartphone) | Danish Agency for Patient Safety |
|
| Estonia | Hoia [74] | UUIDs of infected users | (i) UUIDs of infected users: 14 d (server)
(ii) UUIDs, encounter details: 14 d (smartphone) | Estonian Health Board, Health and Welfare Information Systems Centre |
|
| Finland | Koronavilkku [77] | UUIDs of infected users | (i) UUIDs of infected users: until 31/03/2021 (server)
(ii) UUIDs, encounter details: 14 d (smartphone) | Social Insurance Institution of Finland |
|
| France | StopCovid [79] | UUIDs, encounter details of infected users | (i) Encounter details of infected users: 15 d
(ii) All other data: not more than 6 m after the end of the health emergency state | Outscale |
|
| Germany | Corona-Warn-App [84] | UUIDs of infected users, test results | (i) UUIDs of infected users: 14 d (server)
(ii) Test results: 21 d (server)
(iii) UUIDs, encounter details: 14d (smartphone) | Deutsche Telekom, SAP Deutschland |
|
| Hungary | VirusRadar [88] | UUIDs, smartphone numbers, encounter details of infected users | (i) UUIDs, smartphone numbers: as long as required (server)
(ii) Encounter details of infected users: 30 d
(server)
(iii) UUIDs, encounter details: 14 d (smartphone) | National Center for Public Health, Government Informatics Development Agency |
|
| Ireland | COVID Tracker [90] | UUIDs of infected users, smartphone numbers (optional) | (i) UUIDs of infected users: 14 d (server)
(ii) UUIDs, encounter details: 14 d (smartphone)
(iii) Smartphone numbers: as long as needed | Health Service Executive, NearForm, Twilio |
|
| Italy | Immuni [93] | UUIDs, encounter details of infected users, operational data | (i) All data: until 01/12/2020 | Ministry of Health, Sogei S.p.A. |
|
| Latvia | Apturi Covid [95] | UUIDs, encounter details of infected users | (i) UUIDs, encounter details: 14 d (smartphone)
(ii) all data stored on server for the required time needed by law | SPKC, anonymised data accessible for epidemiological research |
|
| Netherlands | CoronaMelder [98] | UUIDs of infected users | (i) UUIDs of infected users: 14 d (server)
(ii) UUIDs, encounter details: 14 d (smartphone) | Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport, Municipal Health Services |
|
| Norway | Smittestopp [103] | UUIDs, smartphone numbers, age, GPS location, operating system, version number and phone model, encounter details | (i) All personal data: until 01/12/2020
(ii) GPS data and encounter details: 30 d | Ministry of Health, anonymised data accessible to the Institute of Public Health, authorised personnel |
|
| Poland | ProteGO [104] | UUIDs of infected users | (i) UUIDs of infected users: 14 d (server)
(ii) UUIDs, encounter details: 14 d (smartphone) | Ministry of Digital Affairs |
|
| Portugal | StayAway Covid [108] | UUIDs of infected users | (i) UUIDs of infected users: 14 d (server)
(ii) UUIDs, encounter details: 14 d (smartphone) | Ministry of Health |
|
| Slovakia | ZostanZdravy [111] | UUIDs, smartphone numbers of infected users, encounter details of infected users | (i) All data stored for the duration of the state emergency period
(ii) Smartphone numbers: 180 d
(iii) Encounter details of infected users: 21 d | Slovak government, health authorities |
|
| Slovenia | OstaniZdrav [113] | UUIDs of infected users, Covid codes | (i) UUIDs of infected users: 14 d (server)
(ii) teleTAN codes: 21 d (server)
(iii) UUIDs, encounter details: 14 d (smartphone) | National Institute of Public Health, Ministry of Public Administration |
|
| Spain | RadarCOVID [116] | UUIDs of infected users | (i) UUIDs of infected users: 14 d (server)
(ii) UUIDs, encounter details: 14 d (smartphone) | Spanish government |
|
| Switzerland | SwissCovid [119] | UUIDs of infected users, Covid codes | (i) UUIDs of infected users: 14 d (server)
(ii) Covid codes: 24 h (server)
(iii) UUIDs, encounter details: 14 d (smartphone) | Federal Office of Public Health, anonymised data accessible to the Federal Statistical Office |
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