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| Number | Project | Operation time | Risk events | Identified risk factors |
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| 1 | Ningbo Fenglin WTE incineration project | 2001 | The supplied MSW could not be burned immediately due to containing a high level of water. Insufficient MSW treatment facilities led to environmental pollution. The residents suggested the government to close the project, which the government promised to do at the beginning of 2014. Finally, the project was closed in June 2014, although there was still a 14-year concession period remaining | (i) MSW supply risk |
| (ii) Environmental pollution risk |
| (iii) Lack of supporting infrastructure |
| (iv) Government credit risk |
|
| 2 | Zhengzhou Xingjin WTE incineration project | 2000 | Due to insufficient MSW supply, the incinerators had to be used alternately. The operator was suspected of using coal instead of MSW to increase production. The PPP company suffered heavy losses between 2004 and 2005. The transportation cost of MSW was then increased because a new toll station was set up between the CBD and the plant. In 2013, local residents complained that the neighbouring environment was polluted by MSW and wastewater | (i) MSW supply risk |
| (ii) Defective legal and regulatory system |
| (iii) Revenue and cost risk |
| (iv) Government decision-making risk |
| (v) Public opposition risk |
| (vi) Environmental pollution risk |
|
| 3 | Anhui Wuhu WTE incineration project | 2003 | The on-grid electricity price of waste incineration was so low that the plant suffered heavy losses from 2003 to 2005. The supply of MSW was insufficient from 2003 to 2004 | (i) Policy risk |
| (ii) Revenue and cost risk |
| (iii) MSW supply risk |
|
| 4 | Chongqing Tongxing WTE incineration project | 2005 | Both the quantity and the quality of MSW supplied did not reach the expected standard. There was no municipal sewage pipe network on both sides of the main road, which caused serious environmental pollutions. The owners had signed a new contract beyond the concession contract for their own interests. A safety accident occurred because of the poor design of the transportation vehicles. The MSW disposal fee was not paid on time, increasing the financial pressure of the PPP operator in 2006 | (i) MSW supply risk |
| (ii) Lack of supporting infrastructure |
| (iii) Environmental pollution risk |
| (iv) Defective legal and regulatory system |
| (v) Safety risk |
| (vi) Design deficiency |
| (v) Payment risk |
|
| 5 | Kunming Wuhua WTE incineration project | 2008 | Due to unclear regulations and unsuitable technologies, the private investors from the U.S. decided to withdraw their investment in 2006. The supply of MSW was inadequate so that machines were standing idle. The MSW disposal charge was delayed from 2008 to 2013 | (i) Unproven technology |
| (ii) Policy risk |
| (iii) Contract change risk |
| (iv) MSW supply risk |
| (v) Payment risk |
| 6 | Zhongshan Center zutuan WTE incineration project | 2006 | Both the quantity and the quality of the MSW supplied did not reach the expected standard and some equipment was damaged. In 2006, the incinerators were shut down temporarily to clean up the remains caused by unsuitable MSW, which led to heavy losses. In 2014, due to existing environmental pollution, the plant faced strong opposition from the local community | (i) MSW supply risk |
| (ii) Equipment risk |
| (iii) Environmental pollution risk |
| (iv) Public opposition risk |
|
| 7 | Xuchang Tianjian WTE incineration project | 2004 | A financial loss emerged in 2008 due to rising coal prices and the low price of electricity generated from the WTE incinerators. The quality of the MSW supplied did not reach the expected standard, and some equipment was damaged. In 2015, 2016, and 2017, the project was fined by local governments for heavy environmental pollution. With rapid urbanisation, increasing numbers of urban residents were living around the originally desolate WTE incineration plant. Due to outdated technologies, it was difficult for the plant to meet China’s current emission standards. The plant was finally reconstructed on another site in 2017 | (i) Revenue and cost risk |
| (ii) Policy risk |
| (iii) MSW supply risk |
| (iv) Equipment risk |
| (v) Technological backwardness |
| (vi) Environmental pollution risk |
| (vii) Defective legal and regulatory system |
| (viii) Government decision-making risk |
|
| 8 | Beijing Liulitun WTE incineration project | — | The construction site chosen by the local government was located windward of the CBD and close to the water-source protection area of Beijing. The government was trying to conceal risk issues, seriously affecting public credibility. The local residents opposed the project due to potential environmental and health impacts. The project was finally suspended in 2007 | (i) Government decision-making risk |
| (ii) Public opposition risk |
| (iii) Government credit risk |
| (iv) Environmental pollution risk |
|
| 9 | Jiangsu Wujiang WTE incineration project | 2009 | The EIA was insufficient and was considered fake by the local residents. The construction of the project did not stop despite public opposition. Local residents gathered to protest, and the project was finally cancelled in 2009 | (i) Government decision-making risk |
| (ii) Public opposition risk |
|
| 10 | Shenzhen Pinghu WTE incineration project | 2005 | The actual height of the chimney did not match the requirements of the original design documents, resulting in poisonous gas diffusion. The actual situation was not consistent with the promised technical standards, and the equipment for environmental protection did not work for nearly 3 years. In 2009, the local residents opposed the project due to serious environmental pollution involved | (i) Design deficiency |
| (ii) Public opposition risk |
| (iii) Environmental pollution risk |
| (iv) Technological backwardness |
| (v) Equipment risk |
| 11 | Guangzhou Likeng WTE incineration project | 2005 | In 2010, an explosion occurred in the incinerator causing five people to be injured. The plant was then asked to stop for rectification and reformation. Environmental pollution caused by garbage truck leakage frequently occurred. In 2012, the plant was fined because of the incomplete incineration of MSW | (i) Safety risk |
| (ii) Environmental pollution risk |
| (iii) Defective legal and regulatory system |
|
| 12 | Wuxi Xidong WTE incineration project | 2011 | The government’s publicity for the project was insufficient. In 2011, the residents opposed the plant due to black smoke and a pungent odour. The 90% completed project finally failed and suffered great losses | (i) Public opposition risk |
| (ii) Government decision-making risk |
| (iii) Environmental pollution risk |
|
| 13 | Guangxi Laibin WTE incineration project | 2008 | The MSW supply was seriously insufficient in 2008. During 2008–2010, production costs increased significantly due to rising coal prices and a defective subsidy mechanism. In 2011, the plant was closed because of maintenance problems | (i) MSW supply risk |
| (ii) Policy risk |
| (iii) Revenue and cost risk |
|
| 14 | Guangdong Huizhou WTE incineration project | 2007 | Some outdated technologies and second-hand equipment were found to be used in this plant in 2013, resulting in environmental pollution. The project was then opposed by local residents and stopped operation. Some corruption occurred in the bidding process. Relevant monitoring data of the plant were not disclosed in time. The local government finally terminated the contract and started a new one in 2013 | (i) Technological backwardness |
| (ii) Equipment risk |
| (iii) Defective legal and regulatory system |
| (iv) Government behaviour risk |
| (v) Public opposition risk |
| (vi) Environmental pollution risk |
| (vii) Contract change risk |
| (viii) Revenue and cost risk |
|
| 15 | Shanghai Jiangqiao WTE incineration project | 2003 | The EPA did not positively answer the questions raised by hearing representatives. The residents protested over the project’s expansion in 2009. In 2013, a major explosion happened because of the lack of on-site safety management and a third party breaking operation rules | (i) Public opposition risk |
| (ii) Government decision-making risk |
| (iii) Safety risk |
| (iv) Defective legal and regulatory system |
|
| 16 | Hanyang Guodingshan WTE incineration project | 2012 | The plant was constructed in a densely populated area and separated from an existing medical waste incineration plant by a wall. The residents protested due the project’s potentially hazardous impact. In 2013, the project was asked to stop for a variety of reasons, that is, starting to operate without authorisation, inadequate environmental protection facilities, and the uncompleted resettlement of the surrounding residents. However, forced by the pressure of garbage siege, the project was reoperated in 2014 | (i) Government decision-making risk |
| (ii) Environmental pollution risk |
| (iii) Public opposition risk |
| (iv) Defective legal and regulatory system |
| 17 | Wenzhou Leqing WTE incineration project | 2013 | The decision-making procedure was questioned by the local residents because most of them were not informed during both the environmental impact assessment process and the planning and construction approval process. To prevent the expansion of the project, several protests were spontaneously organised by the local residents in 2013 | (i) Government decision-making risk |
| (ii) Public opposition risk |
|
| 18 | Kunming Donggang WTE incineration project | 2012 | Half of the machines became idle because of the shortage of MSW supply. The distance between two WTE incineration plants was too close, resulting in a competitive relationship for MSW resources. Payment of the MSW disposal fees was defaulted from 2012 to 2013 | (i) MSW supply risk |
| (ii) Equipment risk |
| (iii) Government decision-making risk |
| (iv) Payment risk |
|
| 19 | Hangzhou Jiufeng WTE incineration project | — | The technical-based, traditional top-down decision-making approach has led to strong opposition from the local community. However, the response from local governments was inadequate and insufficient in dispelling the residents’ concerns. On May 10, 2014, more than 5,000 local residents protested against the plant, which eventually turned into a mass incident. Finally, the plant was suspended by the local government to restart the decision-making process | (i) Public opposition risk |
| (ii) Government decision-making risk |
|
| 20 | Wuhan north Hankou WTE incineration project | 2010 | Due to Hankou’s rapid urbanisation, the plant was getting closer to the populated residential and commercial areas. The incinerators were not equipped appropriately. In 2014, the local residents protested against the plant because it has caused serious environmental pollution. In the same year, the project was fined by the local government because of illegal disposal of carbon monoxide and fly ash. Finally, the plant was closed and will be rebuilt on another site | (i) Government decision-making risk |
| (ii) Technological backwardness |
| (iii) Public opposition risk |
| (iv) Environmental pollution risk |
| (v) Defective legal and regulatory system |
|
| 21 | Anhui Huainan WTE incineration project | 2014 | Both the quantity and quality of MSW supplied did not reach the expected standard, and one incinerator was idle due to a shortage of MSW supplies in 2014. Some required equipment such as waste-transfer stations, garbage trucks, and garbage compression equipment was ill equipped. The transportation cost of MSW was too high to be profitable because of the long distance between the CBD and the plant | (i) MSW supply risk |
| (ii) Lack of supporting infrastructure |
| (iii) Revenue and cost risk |
| 22 | Hubei Xianning Fengquan WTE incineration project | 2012 | The government did not pay the MSW disposal fees on schedule. The operator lacked experience in investing and operating PPP WTE incineration projects. In 2014, the project was ordered to be suspended for rectification because of toxic gas leakage, substandard sulphur dioxide emissions, and so on. | (i) Payment risk |
| (ii) Insufficient operation capacity |
| (iii) Environmental pollution risk |
| (iv) Defective legal and regulatory system |
|
| 23 | Jilin Siping WTE incineration project | 2011 | Due to the insufficient MSW supplies, a financial loss has emerged since 2012. In 2015, local residents opposed the plant because of the dust, odours, and noise during production. Finally, the plant was forced to suspend production | (i) MSW supply risk |
| (ii) Public opposition risk |
| (iii) Environmental pollution risk |
| (iv) Revenue and cost risk |
|
| 24 | Tianjin Jixian WTE incineration project | 2016 | There were residents and farmland within 300 m of the plant. In 2016, thousands of local residents jointly signed a petition protesting against the plant for its negative impact on the environment and health of the local community. In addition, the operator of the plant was found to have falsified its environmental impact assessment and health risk assessment. Finally, the project was required to stop in 2016 | (i) Government decision-making risk |
| (ii) Public opposition risk |
| (iii) Defective legal and regulatory system |
| (iv) Environmental pollution risk |
|
| 25 | Lanzhou Fengquan WTE incineration project | 2016 | The local residents were seriously affected by the leakage of odour caused by poor equipment. Some required equipment such as cleaning vehicles was ill equipped. In 2016, some illegal sewage pipes were found to have been built by the operator of the plant, which led to serious environmental pollution | (i) Environmental pollution risk |
| (ii) Equipment risk |
| (iii) Lack of supporting infrastructure |
| (iv) Defective legal and regulatory system |
|
| 26 | Chongqing Wanzhou WTE incineration project | 2014 | Due to a serious shortage of garbage from 2014 to 2016, insufficient air could be extracted from the upper end of the trash pit to form the negative pressure needed, which led to a serious odour leakage. A line or two lines were run alternately, accelerating equipment aging. The operator lacks experience in investing and operating PPP WTE incineration projects | (i) MSW supply risk |
| (ii) Equipment risk |
| (iii) Environmental pollution risk |
| (iv) Defective legal and regulatory system |
|
| 27 | Haerbing Shuangqi WTE incineration project | 2014 | The plant was fined by the local government in 2016 for its excessive emission of pollutants, improper disposal of solidified fly ash, and nonstandard operational management | (i) Defective legal and regulatory system |
| (ii) Environmental pollution risk |
|
| 28 | Hubei Xiantao WTE incineration project | — | The technical-based, traditional top-down decision-making approach has led to strong opposition from local communities. In 2016, the project was cancelled by the local government | (i) Public opposition risk |
| (ii) Government decision-making risk |
| 29 | Nanjing Liuhe WTE incineration project | — | As case 28 | (i) Public opposition risk |
| (ii) Government decision-making risk |
|
| 30 | Zhejiang Haiyan WTE incineration project | — | As case 28 | (i) Public opposition risk |
| (ii) Government decision-making risk |
|
| 31 | Guangdong zhaoqing WTE incineration project | — | As case 28 | (i) Public opposition risk |
| (ii) Government decision-making risk |
|
| 32 | Hangzhou Qiaosi WTE incineration project | 2002 | Due to Hangzhou’s rapid urbanisation, the plant was getting closer to the populated residential and commercial areas. The plant was strongly opposed by the local community for its negative impact on the surrounding environment and health. The plant was officially closed in December 2016 | (i) Government decision-making risk |
| (ii) Public opposition risk |
|
| 33 | Feicheng Fengquan WTE incineration project | 2011 | Due to obsolete equipment, constraints on maintenance funds, and other reasons, the pollution control facilities were running poorly and successive excessive pollution problems occurred. The residents constantly complained. In July 2016, the plant operator was interviewed by the local environmental protection department and required to rectify and reform the situation | (i) Equipment risk |
| (ii) Defective legal and regulatory system |
| (iii) Environmental pollution risk |
| (iv) Public opposition risk |
|
| 34 | Shaoxing zhonghuan WTE incineration project | 2008 | The project was heavily fined in 2016 because the company falsified and illegally deleted automatic monitoring data of discharged exhaust gases and then deleted historical data to circumvent inspection. The residents complained about the pollution involved but did not receive any responses | (i) Defective legal and regulatory system |
| (ii) Public opposition risk |
| (iii) Environmental pollution risk |
|
| 35 | Hainan Wanning WTE incineration project | — | The technical-based, traditional top-down decision-making approach led to strong opposition from the local community. A mass incident has occurred on 12 January 2017 | (i) Government decision-making risk |
| (ii) Public opposition risk |
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