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| Number | Project name | Case description | Risk analysis |
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| 1 | Hangzhou Bay Sea-Crossing Bridge | The projected traffic volume was 14.152 million vehicles in 2008. But the actual traffic volume was only 11.124 million in 2010 and 12.524 million in 2012. The actual traffic volume varied significantly from the projected value in the feasibility study report in 2003. The toll as the only source of income was 643 million yuan in 2013, a return on investment of 4%. It was far less than 12.8% as projected. In July 2013, the second crossing-sea bridge Jiashao Bridge over Hangzhou Bay was open to the public, decreasing the revenue further. | Insufficient traffic
Competitive road diversion |
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| 2 | Guangshen Highway | The traffic on Guangzhou-Shenzhen Expressway is always heavy and congested, causing traffic accidents. The revenue has exceeded greatly than predicted since its open to the public. The high return on investment had drawn public concern where cutting the charge level has been strongly advocated. Poor road conditions, serious congestion, and high tolls had become its major criticisms. | Underestimated traffic
Poor road conditions
Traffic congestion
High toll rate
Public opposition |
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| 3 | Nanjing Third Yangtze River Bridge | Nanjing Third Yangtze River Bridge was designed to attract the traffic from Anhui Province to Jiangsu Province. The traffic to and from Anhui is for free on Nanjing First Yangtze River Bridge. In 2007, there were only 15,000 vehicles per day while the traffic of Nanjing First Yangtze River Bridge was 60,000 vehicles. With the continuous improvement of the surrounding road network, more traffic would be diverted. The future of the Third Yangtze River Bridge is not optimistic. Therefore, the toll rates of the Third Bridge were cut down to attract vehicles. However, drivers still preferred going through crowded but free Yangtze River Bridge. As a result, the toll collecting period was officially extended from 25 years to 30 years. The public strongly opposed the period change and questioned constantly. | Insufficient traffic
Competitive road diversion
High toll rate
Long toll collecting period
Public opposition |
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| 4 | Fujian Quanzhou Citong Bridge | Before the construction of the Citong Bridge, there is the Quanzhou Bridge over Jinjiang. Before 1997, the revenue of Quanzhou Bridge was handed to the provincial treasury. So Quanzhou municipal government strongly supported the construction of the Citong Bridge. However, in 1997, the provincial government transferred the operation of Quanzhou Bridge to the Quanzhou municipal government back. The original annual income of Quanzhou Bridge was 50 million. After the completion of the Citong Bridge, the traffic of Quanzhou Bridge suffered steep losses. Its annual income plunged to 30 million. The Citong Bridge and the Quanzhou Bridge became direct competitive bridges. Thus, the existing of Citong Bridge had threated the benefits of Quanzhou Bridge. | Insufficient traffic
Competitive road diversion
Lack of government credit
Incorrect prediction of traffic volume |
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| 5 | Xinyuan Fourth Minjiang River Bridge | Fuzhou municipal government has explicitly guaranteed that all vehicles from the south gate of Fuzhou would go through the Xinyuan Fourth Minjiang River Bridge for 9 years since it was opened to public in 1997, with an annual net ROI of 18%. However, in May 2004, Fuzhou second ring road opened whose access was less than two hundred meters from Baihuting toll stations. Since then, many vehicles bypassed the toll stations to go through the free second ring road, resulting in a sharp decline of the revenue of the fourth bridge. Given no further negotiations were approved, the private sector applied for arbitration. | Insufficient traffic
Fixed returns
Competitive road diversion
Public opposition
Lack of government credit |
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| 6 | Hebei Fude Highway | The Fude Highway was located on the traffic arteries. Its actual traffic growth was far beyond the predictions. In the 8th year, the total investment had been recovered. In addition to operation cost and tax, the operation of the remaining decade is very profitable. | Underestimated traffic volume
Long toll period |
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| 7 | No. 2 and no. 3 Xianyang Wei River Bridge | There are 4 bridges on Wei River in Xianyang. No. 2 and no. 3 were built under the BOT scheme. The average daily traffic in Xianyang City was 100,000 vehicles. Many drivers chose no. 1 Xianyang Bridge as it is free. It caused high traffic pressure and congestion in the city of Xianyang. The public has been requesting the cancellation of tolls at no. 2 and no. 3 bridges to ease the congestion. On May 1, 2011, the municipal government decided to buy back the operation of two bridges. This caused 750 million loss for the investors. | Public opposition
High toll rate |
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