Advances in Civil Engineering

Research Article

Credit Default of Local Public Sectors in Chinese Government-Pay PPP Projects: Evidence from Ecological Construction

Table 3

General information on 15 cases from ecological construction.


Number	Project	Contract period	Investment (RMB)	Data source	Brief information

1	Lianjiang Tangshan Water Plant	1997–2027	130 million	[1, 125]	(i) Actual demand and water price were much lower than the contracted level and the contract may be lost. The water plant was forced to be idle.
2	Shandong Zhonghua Project	1997–2017	17.6 million	[119, 126]	(i) Pricing standards approved by LPSs made it difficult to meet the promised level, and LPSs failed to fulfil the uniqueness of the project in the local market.
3	Tianjin Shuanggang Waste Incineration Plant	2013–2035	580 million	[119, 127]	(i) LPSs were committed to provide subsidies, but the amount of the subsidies promised was not defined clearly. Moreover, toxic gases from waste incineration caused public opposition.
4	Western Qinhuangdao Waste Incineration Plant	2008–2038	220 million	[128]	(i) The public objected to the project and reported that the environmental impact report may be fraudulent. LPSs revoked the environmental impact report.
5	Wuxi Xidong Waste Incineration Plant	2008–2028	140 million	[129]	(i) Public opposition arose after the construction stage was finished. LPSs shirked their responsibilities and did not provide a satisfactory explanation. Moreover, media and social organizations misled the public. The project had to be halted.
6	Beijing Liulitun Waste Incineration Plant	2006–2026	126 million	[130]	(i) The project was meant to be implemented 15 years ago. Many residents around the planned location and thousands of people opposed it.
7	Kunming Wuhua Waste Incineration Plant	2003–2033	320 million	[127, 131]	(i) It was difficult to collect the waste fee. In addition, LPSs and the SPV were not in agreement in terms of adjusting the waste disposal fee.
8	Qingdao Veolia Sewage Treatment Project	2003–2038	171 million	[119, 132]	(i) LPSs had limited understanding of the PPP and the frequent changes in attitude towards the project led to long contract negotiations. Moreover, the LPSs also promised an unrealistic rate of return.
9	Changzhou Hengshanqiao Sewage Treatment Project	2005–2035	60 million	[1, 133]	(i) The project closed several times and caused pollution through the sewage from the pipe network overflow. Considering the public opposition, LPSs shut it down temporarily.
10	Changchun Huijin Sewage Treatment Project	2000–2020	200 million	[1, 134]	(i) LPSs reneged on the agreement and refused to pay for SPV, thereby causing them to be charged in 2003.
11	Wuhan Tangxuhu Sewage Treatment Project	2001–2021	90 million	[1]	(i) LPSs failed to accomplish promised work (such as supporting pipe network construction and sewage fee charge). The project was terminated by government buyback.
12	Shenyang No. 9 Water Plant	1996–2016	160 million	[1, 135]	(i) The agreed rate of return on investment was unreasonable, with 18.50% in the first 2–4 years, 21% in the 5th to 14th year, and 11% in the 15th to 20th year. The project was finally terminated by LPSs.
13	Hancheng Sewage Treatment Project	2014–2044	931 million	[136]	(i) The construction period is 10 years, and the project covered an area of 21751 m². The project was terminated by CPSs in 2018 due to poor decision-making process.
14	Luoyang Sewage Treatment Project	2015–2035	190 million	[137]	(i) The project could process 20 kt of sewage daily and was terminated by the Ministry of Finance in 2018 due to poor decision-making process.
15	Muping Waste Incineration Plant	2012–2042	428 million	[137]	(i) The project covered an area of 66,600 m². It could process 800 t of municipal solid waste daily and was terminated by the Ministry of Finance in 2018 due to poor decision-making process.